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STACK SEMANTICS AND THE COMPARISON OF MATERIAL
AND STRUCTURAL SET THEORIES
MICHAEL A. SHULMAN
Abstract. We extend the usual internal logic of a (pre)topos to a more gen-
eral interpretation, called the stack semantics, which allows for “unbounded”
quantifiers ranging over the class of objects of the topos. Using well-founded
relations inside the stack semantics, we can then recover a membership-based
(or “material”) set theory from an arbitrary topos, including even set-theoretic
axiom schemas such as collection and separation which involve unbounded
quantifiers. This construction reproduces the models of Fourman-Hayashi and
of algebraic set theory, when the latter apply. It turns out that the axioms
of collection and replacement are always valid in the stack semantics of any
topos, while the axiom of separation expressed in the stack semantics gives
a new topos-theoretic axiom schema with the full strength of ZF. We call a
topos satisfying this schema autological.
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1. Introduction
It is well-known that elementary topos theory is roughly equivalent to a weak
form of set theory. The most common statement is that the theory of well-pointed
topoi with natural numbers objects and satisfying the axiom of choice (a.k.a. ETCS;
see [Law64]) is equiconsistent with “bounded Zermelo” set theory (BZC). This is
originally due to Cole [Col73] andMitchell [Mit72]; see also Osius [Osi74]. Moreover,
the proof is very direct: the category of sets in any model of BZC is a model of
The author was supported by a National Science Foundation postdoctoral fellowship during
the writing of this paper.
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ETCS, while from any model of ETCS one can construct a model of BZC out of
well-founded relations. (The same ideas apply to stronger and weaker theories, but
for clarity, in the introduction we will speak mostly about topoi.)
In fact, Lawvere and others have observed that ETCS can itself serve as a foun-
dation for much mathematics, replacing traditional membership-based set theoretic
foundations such as BZC or ZFC. Although the term “set theory” often refers specif-
ically to membership-based theories, it is clear that ETCS is also a set theory, in
the inclusive sense of “a theory about sets.” Pursuant to this philosophy, we will
therefore use the term material set theory for theories such as BZC and ZFC which
are based on a global membership predicate, and structural set theory for theories
such as ETCS which take functions as more fundamental. (Some explanation of
this terminology can be found in the appendix.)
Whatever names we use for them, the relationship between these two types of
theory is like other bridges between fields of mathematics, in that it augments the
toolkit of each side by the ideas and techniques of the other. Of central impor-
tance to such a programme is that under this equivalence, certain constructions in
material set theory, such as forcing, can be identified with certain constructions in
topos theory, such as categories of sheaves. However, there are surprising difficul-
ties in making this precise, regarding the issue of well-pointedness.1 It is only a
well-pointed topos which can be regarded as a structural set theory and to which
the Cole-Mitchell-Osius theory can be applied directly, since only in a well-pointed
topos is an object, like a set, “determined by its elements” 1 → X . But the cat-
egorical constructions in question almost never preserve well-pointedness, so some
trick is necessary to make the correspondence work.
Of course, the trick is well-known in essence: any topos has an “internal logic”
(often called theMitchell-Benabou language) which appears much more set-theoretic.
In the internal logic, we can speak about “elements” of objects, and the semantics
automatically interprets statements about these elements into more appropriate
categorical terms. For instance, a morphism f : X → Y in an arbitrary topos is an
epimorphism if and only if the statement “for all y ∈ Y , there exists an x ∈ X with
f(x) = y” is true in the internal logic.
This trick is quite powerful, and in fact it is fundamental to the whole field of
categorical logic. However, the internal logic of a topos is not a set theory of any
sort (material or structural), but rather a “higher-order type theory.” In particu-
lar, it does not include unbounded quantifiers, i.e. quantifiers ranging over all sets.
This is problematic for the programme of bridging between material and structural
set theories, since many of the most interesting axioms of set theory (especially
separation, collection, and replacement) involve such unbounded quantifiers.
There do exist secondary tricks which have been used to get around this difficulty.
The first was proposed by Fourman [Fou80]: if S is a complete topos (such as a
Grothendieck topos), then we can mimic the construction of the von Neumann
hierarchy inside S. We define inductively an object Vα for each (external) ordinal
α, setting V0 = 0, Vα+1 = PVα, and taking colimits at limit stages (hence the
need for S to be complete). Now the internal logic can speak about “elements”
of the objects Vα, which inherit a “membership” structure from their construction
and can be shown to model material set theories. Hayashi [Hay81] independently
1Recall that a topos is well-pointed if 1 is a generator and there is no map 1 → 0. As we will
see later, this notion requires some revision in an intuitio
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proposed a more general approach in which the Vα can be replaced by any class of
objects satisfying suitable closure conditions.
While this construction works quite well, we find it somewhat unsatisfying for
several reasons. Firstly, it appears to depend on the non-elementary hypothesis
of completeness, which is not preserved by some constructions on toposes (such as
realizability and filterquotients). Secondly, it appears to depend on power objects,
which would make it inapplicable to compare pretoposes with “predicative” material
set theories. Finally, the treatment of unbounded quantifiers is asymmetrical—they
appear in the material set theory as if by magic, but there is no natural, category-
theoretic, treatment of unbounded quantifiers on the topos side.
A more recent solution, begun by Joyal and Moerdijk in [JM95], is to consider not
just a topos, but a category of classes in which it sits as the “small objects.” This
is a category-theoretic version of material class-set theories such as Bernays-Go¨del
or Morse-Kelley. A category of classes contains a single object V , “the class of all
sets,” which admits a membership relation which satisfies the axioms of material set
theory in the internal logic of the category of classes. This approach, called algebraic
set theory, avoids some of the problems with the Fourman-Hayashi approach. It
is purely elementary at the level of the category of classes, and applies as well in
the absence of powersets. And the internal logic of the category of classes provides
a compelling category-theoretic treatment of “unbounded” quantifiers—they are
simply bounded quantifiers over the class of all sets.
However, algebraic set theory also has its own disadvantages, foremost among
which is the fact that instead of studying a topos by itself, one must now always
somehow construct, and always carry along, a category of classes containing it.
One would ideally wish for a canonical embedding of any topos into a category of
classes, under which all desirable topos-theoretic structure corresponds equivalently
to suitable structure on the category of classes. It is shown in [AF06, AFW06] that
every small topos can be embedded in some category of classes, via a construction
which is in some ways canonical. However, the resulting category of classes will
not, in general, satisfy axioms such as separation, even for toposes which might be
expected to validate them (for instance, those which validate their material counter-
parts under the Fourman-Hayashi interpretation). A different construction is given
by [ABSS07a, ABSS07b], which does in some cases produce categories of classes
satisfying separation, but it is very non-category-theoretic in flavor (in the sense
that it distinguishes between isomorphic objects) and certainly less canonical.
A second problem with algebraic set theory is that one has to worry about
whether any given categorical construction can be extended from elementary toposes
(where the results are usually known and easy) to any categories of classes that may
contain them. In general, this turns out to be true, but the proofs often require a
great deal of work (see, for instance, [AGLW09, vdBM07, vdBM08, vdBM09]).
I do not mean to denigrate the great advances in understanding produced by
algebraic set theory, and the Fourman-Hayashi interpretation has also been very
fruitful. The relationship between the two is also known: the “ideal semantics”
of [ABSS07a, ABSS07b] generalizes the forcing semantics of Hayashi. However,
it would undoubtedly also be useful to have a unified, canonical, elementary, and
category-theoretic treatment of unbounded quantifiers over an arbitrary (pre)topos.
The interpretations of Fourman-Hayashi and algebraic set theory would then, ide-
ally, turn out to be special cases or generalizations of this unified framework.
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The thesis of this paper is that such a thing is indeed possible; it is what we call
the stack semantics. We can motivate this semantics in two ways. The first is to
observe that higher-order type theory (that is, the internal logic of a topos) looks
very much like a fragment of structural set theory (i.e. the theory of well-pointed
topoi). Types correspond to objects of the category, and each term x of type A
corresponds to a morphism 1 → A. In this way any assertion in type theory can
be translated into an assertion in the first-order theory of well-pointed categories.
However, the latter theory also includes quantifiers over objects of the category, so
it is natural to seek a generalization of the internal logic which models the first-
order theory of well-pointed categories, rather than higher-order type theory.2 The
stack semantics is exactly such a generalization.
(When the logic is intuitionistic, as it is in the stack semantics, the notion of
“well-pointed” has to be modified a bit; see §3. For clarity, we usually refer to
this modified property constructive well-pointedness ; thus what the stack semantics
really models is the first-order theory of constructively well-pointed topoi.)
From this point of view, the stack semantics can be defined directly by generaliz-
ing the “Kripke-Joyal” description of the internal logic via a forcing relation. This
description is thus closely related to Hayashi’s forcing interpretation of material set
theory, and also to the forcing semantics defined in [ABSS07b, ABSS07a].
A second motivation for the stack semantics comes from trying to make the
logic of a category of classes more canonical and category-theoretic. Specifically,
if S is a small topos, an obvious “canonical” candidate for a category of classes
containing it is the category Sh(S) of sheaves for the coherent topology on S. (The
category of ideals defined in [AF06, AFW06] is a certain well-behaved subcategory
of Sh(S).) If we then want to interpret “unbounded” quantifiers over objects of S
as “bounded” quantifiers in the internal logic of Sh(S), we need a suitable object
to serve as “the class of sets.” Or, more category-theoretically, we want an internal
category in Sh(S) to serve as “the category of sets,” and ideally we would like this
internal category to also be canonically determined by S.
Now S of course has a canonical representation as a stack over itself, namely
the “self-indexing” or “fundamental fibration” X 7→ S/X . This is not an internal
category in Sh(S), since it is not a strict functor, only a pseudofunctor. But we can
choose some strictification of it, which is therefore an internal category in Sh(S),
and let our “unbounded” quantifiers run over this. This is precisely the approach
taken in [Awo97, Ch. V], where it was additionally observed that in the internal
logic of Sh(S), the self-indexing is (in our terminology) constructively well-pointed.
However, now we take the additional step of isolating the particular fragment of
the internal logic of Sh(S) whose only “unbounded” quantifiers range over the self-
indexing. Modulo one small caveat, this fragment is canonically determined by the
topos S, and when expressed in the sheaf semantics of Sh(S) via a forcing relation
over the site S, it agrees with the stack semantics defined using the first approach.
The caveat is that there is one other thing this logic depends on: the chosen
strictification of the self-indexing. However, this choice only affects the truth values
of “non-category-theoretic” formulas, such as those which assert equalities between
objects. In the stack semantics proper, we exclude such formulas by restricting to
a dependently typed logic in which there simply is no equality predicate between
2Alternately, one can use a type theory allowing propositions which quantify over the universe
Type. We will not do this, but it has certain advantages.
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objects. (This is also precisely the necessary restriction so that the truth of such
formulas be invariant under equivalence of categories.) This restricted logic can
then be naturally identified with a fragment of the internal logic of the 2-category
St(S) of stacks on S. (The internal logic of a 2-category is not well-known, but it
can be defined by close analogy with that of a 1-category; see [Shud].)
The existence of these multiple approaches to the stack semantics contributes to
the feeling that it is a natural part of topos theory, though heretofore seemingly
unappreciated. In fact, however, it is implicitly present throughout the literature.
Topos theory abounds with definitions, arguments, and theorems that are said to be
“internal” statements, but in many cases this cannot be directly understood as an
assertion in the usual internal logic due to the presence of unbounded quantifiers. As
a very simple example, the external topos-theoretic “axiom of choice” (AC) asserts
that every epimorphism splits. This involves an unbounded quantification over all
objects of the topos, so it is not directly internalizable. Instead, the “internal axiom
of choice” (IAC) asserts (in one formulation) that for any object A, the functor
ΠA : S/A→ S preserves epimorphisms. To a beginner, it may not be obvious why
this is the “internalization” of AC. But it turns out that IAC is equivalent to the
validity in the stack semantics of the statement “every epimorphism splits.”
The proper way of internalization of such statements does soon become second
nature to experts, and it has even started to appear more openly in the literature,
such as in the “informal arguments” given in [MP02]. However, to my knowledge
it has never before been given a formal, precise expression. This is what the stack
semantics provides: a formal definition of the language whose statements we can ex-
pect to internalize, along with a procedure for performing that internalization and a
theorem that the resulting semantics is sound. Thus, it has the potential to simplify
and clarify many arguments in topos theory, by reducing them to internalizations
of easier proofs in structural set theory.
(This effect is even more pronounced when the stack semantics is generalized to
the full internal logic of St(S). In [Shuc] we will show that almost any argument in
the “naive” theory of large categories, such as Freyd’s adjoint functor theorem, or
Giraud’s theorem characterizing Grothendieck topoi, can be interpreted in the gen-
eralized stack semantics to immediately yield the corresponding result for indexed
categories over any base topos.)
However, in the present paper we are only concerned with the basic theory of
the stack semantics, and its application to comparison of material and structural
set theories. In particular, by generalizing the higher-order type theory of the in-
ternal logic to a semantics for structural set theory, the stack semantics enables
us to reconstruct an interpretation of material set theory from any topos, by sim-
ply performing a version of the Cole-Mitchell-Osius construction inside the stack
semantics. As suggested previously, this unifies, rather than replaces, the exist-
ing approaches of Fourman-Hayashi and of algebraic set theory. On the one hand,
if the topos is complete, then the Fourman-Hayashi model can be identified with
that derived from the stack semantics (in fact, one version of Hayashi’s approach
essentially is the stack semantics model). On the other hand, if a topos S is em-
bedded inside a category of classes C (and S “generates” C in a suitable sense),
then the stack semantics of S agrees with a fragment of the internal logic of C (as
summarized above in the case C = Sh(S)), and in good cases the resulting models
of material set theory can also be identified.
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In a sense, these equivalences are really only an expected “consistency check.”
We believe that where the stack semantics really shows its worth is in suggesting
topos-theoretic counterparts of additional set-theoretic axioms such as separation,
collection, and replacement, which until now have been largely absent from the
literature. With a little thought, it is not hard to write down axioms for struc-
tural set theory which correspond under the Cole-Mitchell-Osius equivalence to the
material-set-theoretic axioms of separation, collection, and replacement. By then
interpreting these axioms in the stack semantics, we can obtain true topos-theoretic
versions of such axioms which are applicable to an arbitrary topos.
It turns out that under interpretation in the stack semantics, the axioms of
collection and of separation behave quite differently. The axiom of collection (and
hence that of replacement) is always valid in the stack semantics of any topos. (The
fact that forcing semantics always validate collection has been observed elsewhere,
e.g. [ABSS07a].) It follows that the models of material set theory constructed from
the stack semantics always validate the material version of collection, providing a
neat proof of the well-known fact that intuitionistically, collection without separa-
tion adds no proof-theoretic strength. In fact, collection emerges as precisely the
dividing line separating the “internal” stack semantics from the “external” logic:
a constructively well-pointed topos satisfies collection (in the “external” sense, not
in its stack semantics) if and only if validity in its stack semantics is equivalent to
“external” truth for all sentences.
On the other hand, the stack-semantics version of separation seems to be a new
topos-theoretic property. We call a topos with this property autological. Autology3
is also closely connected to the stack semantics: a topos is autological if and only if
its stack semantics is representable, in the same sense that the usual Kripke-Joyal
semantics is always representable. (This motivates the name: a topos is autological
if the logic of its stack semantics can be completely “internalized” by representing
subobjects.) Autology is also quite common and well-behaved; for instance, we will
show in §9 that all complete topoi are autological, and in in [Shub] we will study
its preservation by other topos-theoretic constructions (including realizability).
Moreover, since autology is simply the axiom of separation in the stack semantics,
the Cole-Mitchell-Osius model of material set theory constructed from an auto-
logical topos must validate both collection and separation. Thus, autology provides
a natural and fully topos-theoretic strengthening of the notion of elementary topos,
which is equiconsistent with full ZF set theory, and which “explains” why complete
and realizability topoi are known to model (intuitionistic) ZF. These two cases have
been addressed by algebraic set theory in [ABSS07a, ABSS07b], but as remarked
above, the construction there is non-category-theoretic and non-elementary.
In fact, the relationship of autology to the axiom of separation for categories of
classes is unidirectional: if a category of classes satisfies separation, then its topos
of small objects is autological, but not conversely. The issue is that since autology
is a first-order axiom schema, it can only speak about proper classes which are
definable in some sense over the topos, but the objects of a category of classes need
not be definable in any such way.
One might, however, ask whether every autological topos could be embedded in
some category of classes satisfying separation, analogously to to how every model
3I am indebted to Peter Freyd for this noun form, which is definitely easier on the tongue than
“autological-ness”.
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of ZFC can be embedded in some model of Bernays-Go¨del class-set theory (namely,
the model consisting of its definable proper classes). We will show in [Shua] that
the answer is almost yes: any autological topos can be embedded in a 2-category
of “definable stacks” which satisfies separation, and which satisfies 2-categorical
versions of the axioms of algebraic set theory. However, it seems unlikely that
this can be improved to a 1-category of classes, since this would require some
sort of definable rigidification of the self-indexing. This suggests that perhaps we
should study 2-categories of large categories instead of categories of classes. Such
a modification is also category-theoretically natural, since in practice we generally
only care about elements of a proper class insofar as they form some large category.
See [Shua, Shuc] for further exploration of this idea.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We begin by defining carefully the material
and structural set theories we plan to compare. Since material set theories are
quite familiar, we list their axioms briefly in §2, while in §§3–5 we spend rather
more time on the axioms of structural set theory. In both cases we include “pred-
icative” theories as well as “impredicative” ones. Then in §6 we describe a version
of the Cole-Mitchell-Osius comparison that is valid even predicatively, since the
construction does not appear to be in the literature in this generality.
The core of the paper is §7, in which we introduce the stack semantics and
prove its basic properties, including the interpretations of the axioms of separation
and collection mentioned above. It is then almost trivial to derive the desired
interpretations of material set theory; we say a few words about this in §8. Then in
§§9 and 10 we show that this interpretation agrees with both the Fourman-Hayashi
model and with the models of algebraic set theory. Appendix A is devoted to some
philosophical remarks comparing material and structural set theory, particularly as
foundations for mathematics.
Our basic reference for topos-theoretic notions is [Joh02]. One important thing
to note is that we will use intuitionistic logic in all contexts. This is in contrast
to the common practice in topos theory of reasoning about the topos itself using
classical logic, though the internal logic of the topos is intuitionistic. Our approach
is necessary because we want all of our arguments to remain valid in the stack
semantics, which, like the internal logic of a topos, is generally intuitionistic. We
treat classical logic as an axiom schema (namely, ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ for all formulas ϕ) which
may or may not be satisfied by any given model.
All of our theories, material and structural, are of course properly expressed in
a formal first-order language. However, to make the paper easier to read, we will
usually write out logical formulas in English, trusting the reader to translate them
into formal symbols as necessary. To make it clear when our mathematical English
is to be interpreted as code for a logical formula, we will often use sans serif font
and corner quotes. Thus, for example, in a structural set theory, pevery surjection
has a sectionq represents the axiom of choice.
IfM models some theory, by a formula in M we mean the result of substituting
elements ofM for some of the free variables of a formula ϕ in a well-typed way. The
substituted elements of M are called parameters. If parameters are substituted
for all the free variables of ϕ (including the case when ϕ had no free variables), we
say ϕ is a sentence in M. There is an obvious notion of when a sentence ϕ in M
is true, which we denoteM  ϕ (readM satisfies ϕ). Recall that our metatheory,
in which we formulate this notion of truth, is intuitionistic.
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Many of the axioms we state will be axiom schemas depending on some formula
ϕ. In each such case, ϕ may have arbitrary additional unmentioned parameters.
Equivalently, such axiom schemas can be regarded as implicitly universally quanti-
fied over all the unmentioned variables of ϕ.
I would like to thank Steve Awodey, Toby Bartels, Peter Lumsdaine, Colin
McLarty, Thomas Streicher, Paul Taylor, and the patrons of the n-Category Cafe´
for many helpful conversations and useful comments on early drafts of this paper.
2. Material set theories
Our material set theories will be theories in one-sorted first order logic, with a
single binary relation symbol ∈, whose variables are called sets. (We will briefly
mention the possibility of “atoms” which are not sets at the end of this section.)
In such a theory, a ∆0-quantifier is one of the form (∃x ∈ a) or (∀x ∈ a), and a
∆0-formula (also called restricted or bounded) is one with only ∆0-quantifiers. The
prefix “∆0-” on any axiom schema indicates that the formulas appearing in it are
restricted to be ∆0; we sometimes use the adjective “full” to indicate the lack of
any such restriction.
Definitions 2.1.
• We write { x | ϕ(x) } for a set a such that x ∈ a⇔ ϕ(x), if such a set exists.
• A relation from a to b is a set r of ordered pairs (x, y) such that x ∈ a and
y ∈ b, where (x, y) = {{x}, {x, y}}.
• A relation r from a to b is entire (or a many-valued function) if for all x ∈ a
there exists y ∈ b with (x, y) ∈ r. If each such y is unique, r is a function.
• A relation r is bi-entire if both r and ro = { (y, x) | (x, y) ∈ r } are entire.
The following set of axioms (in intuitionistic logic) we call the core axioms;
they form a subsystem of basically all material set theories.
• Extensionality: pfor any x and y, x = y if and only if for all z, z ∈ x iff z ∈ yq.
• Empty set: pthe set ∅ = {} existsq.
• Pairing: pfor any x and y, the set {x, y} existsq.
• Union: pfor any x, the set { z | (∃y ∈ x)(z ∈ y) } existsq.
• ∆0-Separation: For any ∆0-formula ϕ(x), pfor any a, { x ∈ a | ϕ(x) } existsq.
• Limited ∆0-replacement : For any ∆0-formula ϕ(x, y), pfor all a and b, if for every
x ∈ a there exists a unique y with ϕ(x, y), and moreover z ⊆ b for all z ∈ y, then
the set { y | (∃x ∈ a)ϕ(x, y) } existsq.
The first five of these are standard, while the last, though very weak, is unusual.
We include it because we want our core axioms to imply a well-behaved category
of sets, for which purpose the other five are not quite enough. It is satisfied in
basically all material set theories, since it is implied both by ordinary replacement
(even ∆0-replacement), and by the existence of power sets (using ∆0-separation).
We now list some additional axioms of material set theory, pointing out the
most important implications between them. Of course, there are many possible
set-theoretic axioms; we will consider only the most common and important ones.
One major axis along which set theories vary is “impredicativity,” expressed by
the following sequence of axioms (of increasing strength):
• Exponentiation: pfor any a and b, the set ba of all functions from a to b existsq.
• Fullness: pfor any a, b there exists a set m of entire relations from a to b such that
for any entire relation f from a to b, there is a g ∈ m with g ⊆ fq.
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• Power set: pfor any set x, the set Px = { y | y ⊆ x } existsq.
Each of these is strictly stronger than the preceding one, but in the presence of
either of the following:
• ∆0-classical logic: for any ∆0-formula ϕ, we have ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
• Full classical logic: for any formula ϕ, we have ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
the hierarchy of predicativity collapses, since power sets can then be obtained (using
limited ∆0-replacement) from sets of functions into a 2-element set. Hence classical
logic is also impredicative. Also considered impredicative is:
• (Full) Separation: For any formula ϕ(x), pfor any a, { x ∈ a | ϕ(x) } existsq.
Full separation and ∆0-classical logic together imply full classical logic, since we can
form a = { ∅ | ϕ } ⊆ { ∅ }, and then (∅ ∈ a) ∨ (∅ 6∈ a) is an instance of ∆0-classical
logic that implies ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
We also have the collection and replacement axioms.
• Collection: for any formula ϕ(x, y), pfor any a, if for all x ∈ a there is a y with
ϕ(x, y), then there is a b such that for all x ∈ a, there is a y ∈ b with ϕ(x, y), and
for all y ∈ b, there is a x ∈ a with ϕ(x, y)q.
• Replacement: for any formula ϕ(x, y), pfor any a, if for every x ∈ a there exists a
unique y with ϕ(x, y), then the set { y | (∃x ∈ a)ϕ(x, y) } existsq.
With an evident extension of 2.1 to formulas, we can state collection as “if ϕ is
entire on a, then there exists b such that ϕ is bi-entire from a to b.” Collection
also evidently implies replacement. Classical ZF set theory is usually defined using
replacement rather than collection, but in the presence of the other axioms of
ZF, collection can be proven. (Replacement and full classical logic together also
imply full separation.) This is no longer true in intuitionistic logic, though, or in
classical logic without the axiom of foundation, and in practice the extra strength
of collection is sometimes important. There are also other versions of collection,
all of which are equivalent in the presence of full separation, but the one we have
chosen seems most appropriate in its absence.
We state the axiom of infinity as the existence of the set ω of finite von Neumann
ordinals. Together with the core axioms, this implies the Peano axioms for ω,
including induction for any property to which we can apply separation. For a
stronger version of induction, we need a separate axiom.
• Infinity: pthere exists a set ω such that ∅ ∈ ω, if x ∈ ω then x ∪ {x} ∈ ω, and if z
is any other set such that ∅ ∈ z and if x ∈ z then x ∪ {x} ∈ z, then ω ⊆ zq.
• Induction: for any formula ϕ, pif ϕ(∅) and ϕ(x) ⇒ ϕ(x ∪ {x}) for any x ∈ ω,
then ϕ(x) for all x ∈ ωq.
There is also:
• Choice: pfor any set a, if for all x ∈ a there exists a y ∈ x, then there exists a
function f from a to
⋃
a such that f(x) ∈ x for all x ∈ aq.
By Diaconescu’s argument [Dia75], choice and power set together imply ∆0-classical
logic. There are of course many variants of choice, such as countable, dependent,
or “multiple” choice, or the “presentation axiom” (a.k.a. “EPSets” or “COSHEP,”
the Category Of Sets Has Enough Projectives), but we will confine our attention
to the ordinary version.
Finally, we have the family of “foundation-type” axioms. Recall that a set x is
called transitive if z ∈ y ∈ x implies z ∈ x. A setX with a binary relation≺ is called
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well-founded if whenever Y ⊆ X is inductive, in the sense that (∀y ≺ x)(y ∈ Y )
implies x ∈ Y , then in fact Y = X . It is extensional if (∀z ∈ X)(z ≺ x ⇔ z ≺ y)
implies x = y.
• Set-induction: for any formula ϕ(x), pif for any set y, ϕ(x) for all x ∈ y implies
ϕ(y), then ϕ(x) for any set xq.
• Foundation, a.k.a. ∆0-Set-induction: like set-induction, but only for ∆0-formulas.
• Transitive closures: pevery set is a subset of a smallest transitive setq.
• Mostowski’s principle: pevery well-founded extensional relation is isomorphic to a
transitive set equipped with the relation ∈q.
The usual “classical” formulation of foundation is
• Regularity: pif x is nonempty, there is some y ∈ x such that x ∩ y = ∅q.
In the presence of transitive closures, regularity is equivalent to the conjunction of
∆0-set-induction and ∆0-classical logic. Thus, in an intuitionistic theory, ∆0-set-
induction is preferable. Of course, ∆0-set-induction follows from full set-induction,
while the converse is true if we have full separation. Set-induction also implies
ordinary induction, since < and ∈ are the same for von Neumann ordinals.
Transitive closures can be constructed either from set-induction and replace-
ment (see [AR01]), or from infinity, ordinary (full) induction, and replacement.
Mostowski’s original proof shows that his principle follows from replacement and
full separation. Transitive closures and Mostowski’s principle are not usually con-
sidered “foundation” axioms, but we group them thusly for several reasons:
• The conjunction of transitive closures, Mostowski’s principle, and foundation is
equivalent to the single statement “to give a set is the same as to give a well-
founded extensional relation with a specified element.” One could argue that
this sums up the objects of study of well-founded material set theory.
• As we will see in §6, it follows that the material set theories that can be con-
structed from structural ones are precisely those which satisfy these three axioms.
• Finally, the various axioms of anti-foundation are also naturally stated as “to
give a set is the same as to give a (blank) relation with a specified element,”
where (blank) denotes some stronger type of extensionality (there are several
choices; see [Acz88]). Thus, these axioms naturally include analogues not just
of foundation, but also of transitive closures and Mostowski’s principle.
Some particular material set theories with names include the following. Note that
the prefix constructive is generally reserved for “predicative” theories (including,
potentially, exponentiation and fullness, but never power sets or full separation)
while intuitionistic refers to “impredicative” (but still non-classical) theories which
may have power sets or full separation. None of these theories include our axiom
of limited ∆0-replacement explicitly, but all include either power sets or a stronger
version of replacement, both of which imply it.
• The standard Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Choice (ZFC) includes
all the axioms mentioned above, although it suffices to assume the core axioms
together with full classical logic, power sets, replacement, infinity, foundation,
and choice.
• By Zermelo set theory (Z) one usually means the core axioms together with
full classical logic, power sets, full separation, and infinity.
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• The theory ZBQC of [ML86], called RZC in [MLM94, VI.10], consists of the
core axioms together with full classical logic, power sets, infinity, choice, and
regularity.
• The Mostowski set theory (MOST) of [Mat01] consists of ZBQC together
with transitive closures and Mostowski’s principle.
• ByKripke-Platek set theory (KP) is usually meant the core axioms together
with full classical logic, a form of ∆0-collection (sufficient to imply our limited
∆0-replacement), and set-induction for some class of formulas.
• Aczel’s Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel (CZF) consists of the core axioms
together with fullness, collection, infinity, and set-induction; see [AR01]. His
CZF0 consists of the core axioms, replacement, infinity, and induction.
• The usual meaning of Intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel (IZF) is the core
axioms together with power sets, full separation, collection, infinity, and set-
induction. This is the strongest theory that can be built from the above axioms
without any form of classical logic or choice.
• The Basic Constructive Set Theory (BCST) of [AFW06] consists essen-
tially of the core axioms together with replacement. Their Constructive Set
Theory (CST) adds exponentials to this, and their Basic Intuitionistic Set
Theory (BIST) adds power sets. (These theories also allow atoms; see below.)
• The Rudimentary Set Theory (RST) of [vdBM07] consists of the core ax-
ioms together with collection and set-induction.
So far we have considered only theories of pure sets, i.e. in which everything is
a set. If we want to also allow “atoms” or “urelements” which are not sets, we can
modify any of the above theories by adding a predicate px is a setq, whose negation
is read as px is an atomq. We then add the following axioms:
• Decidability of sethood: pevery x is either a set or an atomq.
• Only sets have elements: pif x ∈ y, then y is a setq.
• Set of atoms: pthe set { x | x is an atom } existsq.
and modify the extensionality axiom so that it applies only to sets:
• Extensionality for sets: pfor any sets x and y, x = y if and only if for all z, z ∈ x
iff z ∈ yq.
3. Structural set theory: well-pointed Heyting pretoposes
We now move on to structural set theories. Here we must be a little more careful
with the ambient logic. The theory of categories can, of course, be formulated in
ordinary first-order logic, but this is unsatisfactory because it allows us to discuss
equality of objects. We need all our formulas to express “category-theoretic” facts,
and thus we must avoid ever asserting that two objects are equal (rather than
isomorphic). However, we cannot simply remove the equality predicate on objects
from the ordinary first-order theory, because there are situations in which we do
need to know that two objects are the same. For example, to compose two arrows
f and g, we need to know that the source of g is the same as the target of f .
The solution to this problem, which has seemingly been rediscovered many times
(see, for instance, [Bla79, Fre76, Mak95, Mak01]) is to use a language of dependent
types. We give here a somewhat informal description in an attempt to avoid the
complicated precise syntax of dependent type theory, but the reader familiar with
DTT should easily be able to expand our description into a formal one.
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Definition 3.1. The language of categories (with terminal object) consists of
the following.
(i) There is a type of objects.
(ii) There is a specified object-term 1.
(iii) For object-terms X and Y , there is a type X → Y of arrows from X to Y .
(iv) For each object-term X , there is an arrow-term 1X : X → X .
(v) For any object-terms X , Y , and Z and each pair of arrow-terms f : X → Y
and g : Y → Z, there is an arrow-term (g ◦ f) : X → Z.
(vi) For any arrow-terms f, g : X → Y , there is an atomic formula (f = g).
Non-atomic formulas are built up from atomic ones in the usual way, using connec-
tives >, ⊥, ∧, ∨, ⇒, ¬, and quantifiers ∃ and ∀. There are of course two types of
quantifiers, for object-variables and for arrow-variables. Any category is a structure
for this language, and we have the usual satisfaction relation A  ϕ for a category
A and a sentence ϕ in A.
Of course, this theory uses very little of the full machinery of DTT, and in
particular it may be said to live in the “first-order” fragment of DTT. In this way
it is closely related to the logic FOLDS studied in [Mak95], although we are allowing
some term constructors in addition to relations.
Our inclusion of a specified term 1, intended to denote a terminal object, is just
for convenience; it will make it easier to single out the ∆0-formulas. The other main
thing to note is that, as in FOLDS, the only atomic formulas are equalities between
parallel arrows; the language does not allow us to even discuss whether two objects
are equal. This implies that “truth is isomorphism- and equivalence-invariant,” in
a sense we can make precise as follows.
Let A be a category, let ϕ be a sentence in A, and suppose we are given, for
each object-parameter A in ϕ, an isomorphism A ∼−→ A′ in A. Let ϕ′ denote the
sentence in A obtained from ϕ by replacing each object-parameter A by A′ and
each arrow-parameter A
j
−→ B by the composite
A′
∼=−→ A
j
−→ B
∼=−→ B′.
We call ϕ′ an isomorph of ϕ. Likewise, if F : A → B is any functor and ϕ is a
sentence in A, we write F (ϕ) for the sentence in B obtained by applying F to all
the parameters of ϕ. The following can then easily be proven by induction on the
construction of formulas.
Lemma 3.2 (Isomorphism-invariance of truth). If ϕ is a sentence in A and ϕ′ an
isomorph of ϕ, then A  ϕ if and only if A  ϕ′. 
Lemma 3.3 (Equivalence invariance of truth). If F is fully faithful and essentially
surjective, then A  ϕ if and only if B  F (ϕ). 
In fact, the dependently typed theory of categories characterizes exactly those
properties of categories which are invariant under equivalence in this sense; see [Bla79,
Fre76, Mak95].
We now begin a listing of the axioms of the structural set theories we will con-
sider. First of all, we must have a category, so we include:
• Identity: 1Y ◦ f = f = f ◦ 1X .
• Associativity: h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f .
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Many of the additional axioms of structural set theories assert well-known cate-
gorical properties. Recall that a Heyting category is a category S satisfying the
following axioms.
• Finite limits: pS has pullbacks, and 1 is a terminal objectq.
• Regularity: pevery morphism factors as a regular epi followed by a monic, and
regular epis are stable under pullbackq.
• Coherency: pfinite unions of subobjects exist and are stable under pullbackq.
• Dual images: pfor any f : X → Y , the pullback functor f∗ : Sub(Y ) → Sub(X)
has a right adjoint ∀fq.
Here Sub(X) denotes the poset of subobjects of X , i.e. of monomorphisms into X
modulo isomorphism. If S also satisfies
• Positivity/extensivity: pS has disjoint and pullback-stable binary coproductsq.
it is called positive (or extensive). If it is positive and also satisfies:
• Exactness: pevery equivalence relation is a kernelq.
it is called a Heyting pretopos. A Heyting pretopos which also satisfies:
• Local cartesian closure: pfor every arrow f : X → Y , the pullback functor f∗ : S/Y →
S/X has a right adjoint Πfq
(which implies dual images) is called a Π-pretopos. Finally, if it satisfies:
• Power objects: pevery object X has a power object PXq
(which, together with finite limits, implies all the other axioms of a Π-pretopos)
it is called an (elementary) topos. See, e.g., [Joh02, §A.1] for more details. In
particular, we remind the reader that in a pretopos, every monic and every epic is
regular, and thus it is balanced (every monic epic is an isomorphism). Also, the self-
indexing of any regular category is a prestack for its regular topology (generated by
regular epimorphisms), and it is a stack if the category is exact (such as a pretopos).
Remark 3.4. Axioms which assert the existence of adjoints (such as dual images and
local cartesian closure) seemingly go beyond first-order logic, but they can easily
be formulated in an elementary way, as simply asserting the existence of objects
with a suitable universal property.
Three other important axioms are the following:
• Booleanness: pevery subobject has a complementq.
• Full classical logic: for any formula ϕ, we have ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
• Infinity: pthere exists a natural number object (nno)q.
• Choice: pevery regular epimorphism splitsq.
(If S is not cartesian closed, then the definition of an nno should be taken with
arbitrary parameters; see [Joh02, A2.5.3].)
Each of the above axioms (beyond those of a Heyting pretopos) is, more or
less obviously, a counterpart of some axiom of material set theory. The first easy
observation is that each material axiom implies its corresponding structural axiom
for the category of sets.
Theorem 3.5. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory, then the sets
and functions in V form a Heyting pretopos Set(V). Moreover:
(i) If V satisfies exponentiation, then Set(V) is locally cartesian closed.
(ii) If V satisfies the power set axiom, then Set(V) is a topos.
(iii) If V satisfies ∆0-classical logic, then Set(V) is Boolean.
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(iv) If V satisfies full classical logic, so does Set(V).
(v) If V satisfies infinity and exponentials, then Set(V) has a nno.
(vi) If V satisfies the axiom of choice, then so does Set(V).
Proof. We first show that Set(V) is a category. Using pairing and limited ∆0-
replacement, we can form, for any set a and any x ∈ a, the set pa,x of all pairs
{x, y} for y ∈ a. Again using limited ∆0-replacement, we can form the set of all
the pa,x for x ∈ a, and take its union, thereby obtaining the set of all pairs {x, y}
for x, y ∈ a. Applying this construction twice to a ∪ b =
⋃
{a, b}, we can then
use ∆0-separation to cut out the set a × b of ordered pairs (x, y) where x ∈ a and
y ∈ b. With this in hand we can define function composition and identities using
∆0-separation.
Finite limits are straightforward: we already have products, {∅} is a terminal
object, and ∆0-separation supplies equalizers. The construction of pullback-stable
images, unions, and dual images is also easy from ∆0-separation. A stable and
disjoint coproduct a + b can as usual be obtained as a subset of {0, 1} × (a ∪ b).
And if r ⊆ a× a is an equivalence relation, ∆0-separation supplies the equivalence
class of any x ∈ a, and limited ∆0-replacement then supplies the set of all such
equivalence classes.
Exponentiation clearly implies cartesian closedness. For local cartesian closed-
ness, suppose given f : a → b and g : x → a. Then the fiber of Πf (g) → b over
j ∈ b should be the set of all functions s : f−1(j) → x such that g ◦ s = 1f−1(j);
this can be cut out of xf
−1(j) by ∆0-separation. Finally, the entire set Πf (g) can
be constructed from these and limited ∆0-replacement, since each element of each
fiber is a subset of a× x.
The relationship between power sets and power objects is analogous. Likewise,
∆0-classical logic is equivalent to saying that every subset has a complement, which
certainly implies Booleanness of Set(V). The implication for full classical logic is
also evident.
Now suppose that V satisfies infinity and exponentials, and let ω be as in the
axiom of infinity; we define 0 ∈ ω and s : ω → ω in the obvious way. Suppose
given A
g
−→ B
t
←− B; we must construct a unique function f : A × ω → B such
that f(1A × 0) = gpi1 and f(1A × s) = tf . Let R = { (a, b) ∈ ω × ω | a ∈ b } with
projection pi2 : R → ω, and let X be the exponential (B × ω → ω)(A×R→ω) in
Set/ω; thus an element of X is equivalent to an n ∈ ω together with a function
f : A × {m | m ∈ n } → B. Using ∆0-separation, we have the subset Y ⊆ X
of those f ∈ X such that f(a, 0) = g(a) and f(a, s(m)) = t(f(a,m)) whenever
s(m) ∈ n. We then prove by induction that for all n ∈ ω there exists an f ∈ Y
with n ∈ dom(f) and that for any two such f, f ′ we have f(n) = f ′(n). The union
of Y is then the desired function.
Finally, if V satisfies choice, then from any surjection p : e→ b we can construct,
using limited ∆0-replacement, the set
{
p−1(x)
∣∣ x ∈ b }, and applying the material
axiom of choice to this gives a section of p. 
However, not every Heyting pretopos deserves to be called a model of structural
set theory. The distinguishing characteristic of a set, as opposed to an object of
some more general category, is that a set is determined by its elements and nothing
more. This is expressed by the following property.
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Definition 3.6. A Heyting category S is constructively well-pointed if it sat-
isfies the following.
(a) If m : A  X is monic and every 1
x
−→ X factors through m, then m is an
isomorphism (1 is a strong generator).
(b) Every regular epimorphism X  1 splits (1 is projective).
(c) If 1 is expressed as the union of two subobjects 1 = A ∪B, then either A or B
must be isomorphic to 1 (1 is indecomposable).
(d) There does not exist a map 1→ 0 (1 is nonempty).
Remark 3.7. Of course, since regular epis are stable under pullback, 1 is projective
if and only if for any regular epi Y
p
−− X , every global element 1→ X lifts to Y .
Likewise, since unions are stable under pullback, 1 is indecomposable if and only if
wheneverX = A∪B, every global element 1→ X factors through either A or B. In
particular, if S is locally small in some external set theory, then S is constructively
well-pointed if and only if S(1,−) : S→ Set is a conservative coherent functor.
We immediately record the following.
Proposition 3.8. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory, then Set(V)
is constructively well-pointed.
Proof. Functions 1→ X in Set(V) are in canonical correspondence with elements
of X , and a function is monic just when it is injective. Thus, if every map from 1
factors through a monic, it must be bijective, and hence an isomorphism, so 1 is a
strong generator. Next, the epics in Set(V) are the surjections, and if X
p
−− 1 is
a surjection, then X must be inhabited, hence p splits. And if 1 = A∪B, then the
unique element of 1 must be in either A or B by definition of unions, hence either
A or B must be inhabited. Finally, ∅ has no elements, so 1 is nonempty. 
Recall that classically, a topos is said to be well-pointed if 1 is a generator (i.e.
for f, g : X ⇒ Y , having fx = gx for all 1
x
−→ X implies f = g) and there is
no map 1 → 0 (1 is nonempty). Thus, any constructively well-pointed topos is
well-pointed in the classical sense. Conversely, the following is well-known (see, for
instance, [MLM94, VI.1 and VI.10]).
Lemma 3.9. Let S be a Heyting category satisfying full classical logic, and in
which 1 is a nonempty strong generator. Then S is Boolean and constructively
well-pointed.
Proof. For any object X , either X is initial or it isn’t. If it isn’t, then there must be
a global element 1→ X , since otherwise the monic 0 X would be an isomorphism
(since 1 is a strong generator). Therefore, if X is not initial, then X → 1 is split
epic. Now suppose that X is any object such that X → 1 is regular epic; since
0 → 1 is not regular epic, it follows that X is not initial, and so X → 1 must in
fact be split epic; thus 1 is projective. Also, if 1 = A ∪ B, then A and B cannot
both be initial, so one of them has a global element; thus 1 is indecomposable.
Now let A X be a subobject and assume that A ∪ ¬A is not all of X . Then
since 1 is a strong generator, there is a 1
x
−→ X not factoring through A ∪ ¬A.
Let V = x∗(A ∪ ¬A). Then V is a subobject of 1. If V is not initial, then it has
a global element and hence is all of 1, so x factors through A ∪ ¬A. But if V is
initial, then x∗(A) must also be initial, which implies that x factors through ¬A.
This is a contradiction, so A ∪ ¬A = X ; hence S is Boolean. 
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Corollary 3.10. Let S be a topos satisfying full classical logic, which is well-pointed
in the classical sense. Then S is Boolean and constructively well-pointed.
Proof. In a topos, any generator is a strong generator. 
Thus, in the presence of full classical logic, our notion of constructive well-
pointedness is equivalent to the usual notion of well-pointedness. However, Proposition 3.8
shows that a constructively well-pointed topos not satisfying full classical logic need
not be Boolean. One can also construct examples showing that in the absence of
full classical logic, a Boolean topos in which 1 is a nonempty generator need not
be constructively well-pointed. It is true, however, even intuitionistically, that if 1
is projective, indecomposable, and nonempty in a Boolean topos, it must also be a
generator; see [Awo97, V.3].
Other authors have also recognized the importance of explicitly assuming pro-
jectivity and indecomposability of 1 in an intuitionistic context. In [Awo97] a topos
in which 1 is projective, indecomposable, and nonempty was called hyperlocal (but
in [Joh92, Joh02] that word is used for a stronger, non-elementary, property). And
in [Pal], indecomposability of 1 is assumed explicitly, while projectivity of 1 is
deduced from a factorization axiom. We note that most classical properties of a
well-pointed topos make use of projectivity and indecomposability of 1, and many
of these are still true intuitionistically as long as the category is constructively
well-pointed.
Lemma 3.11. Let S be a constructively well-pointed Heyting category. Then:
(i) A morphism p : Y → X is regular epic if and only if every map 1→ X factors
through it.
(ii) Likewise, f : Y → X is monic if and only if every map 1→ X factors through
it in at most one way, and an isomorphism if and only if every map 1 → X
factors through it uniquely.
(iii) Given two subobjects A  X and B  X, we have A ≤ B if and only if
every map 1→ X which factors through A also factors through B.
(iv) X is initial if and only if there does not exist any morphism 1→ X.
Proof. The “only if” part of (i) follows because 1 is projective. For the “if” part,
note that a map p : Y → X in a regular category is regular epic iff its image is all
of X , while if every 1→ X factors through p then it must factor through im(p) as
well; hence im(p) is all of X since 1 is a strong generator.
The “only if” parts of (ii) are obvious. If f : Y → X is injective on global
elements, then the canonical monomorphism Y → Y ×X Y is bijective on global
elements, and hence an isomorphism; thus Y is monic. And if f is bijective on
global elements, then by this and by (i) it must be both monic and regular epic,
hence an isomorphism.
The “only if” part of (iii) is also obvious. If every 1→ X which factors through
A also factors through B, then in the pullback
A ∩B
_

//

B

A // X
the map A ∩B → A must be an isomorphism, since 1 is a strong generator; hence
its inverse provides a factorization of A through B.
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Finally, the “only if” part of (iv) is the nonemptiness assumption, while if X has
no global elements, then the map 0→ X is bijective on global elements and hence
an isomorphism. 
Remark 3.12. In terms of the internal logic, indecomposability of 1 corresponds to
the disjunction property (if ϕ ∨ ψ is true, then either ϕ is true or ψ is true), while
projectivity of 1 corresponds to the existence property (if (∃x)ϕ(x) is true, then
there is a particular a such that ϕ(a) is true). We might also call nonemptiness of
1 the negation property (⊥ is not true).
Remark 3.13. (Constructive) well-pointedness has a very different flavor from all
the other axioms of structural set theory we have encountered so far. In particular,
it is not preserved by slicing, or by most other categorical constructions. This is to
be expected, however, since “being the category of sets” is quite a fragile property.
We have now reached the point where we can define what we mean by a structural
set theory: an extension of the axiomatic theory describing a constructively well-
pointed Heyting pretopos. For example:
• Lawvere’s Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets (ETCS), defined
in [Law64], is the theory of a well-pointed topos with a nno satisfying full
classical logic and the axiom of choice.
• Palmgren’s Constructive ETCS (CETCS), defined in [Pal], is the theory of
a constructively well-pointed Π-pretopos with a nno and enough projectives.
• We will refer to the theory of a constructively well-pointed topos with a nno as
Intuitionistic ETCS (IETCS).
Convention 3.14. When working in a structural set theory, we usually write Set
for the category in question. We call its objects sets and its arrows functions. We
speak of morphisms 1 → X as elements of X , and we write x ∈ X synonymously
for x : 1→ X . If f : X → Y is a function and x ∈ X , we write f(x) for f ◦x : 1→ Y .
We speak of monomorphisms S  X as subsets of X and write S ⊆ X . For x ∈ X
and S ⊆ X , we write x ∈ S and say “x is contained in S” to mean that 1
x
−→ X
factors through S  X . Similarly, for S, T ⊆ X we write S ⊆ T to mean that
S X factors through T  X . We also use the following terminology.
• An arrow-variable x : 1→ X whose domain is 1 is a ∆0-variable.
• An equality (f = g) of arrow-terms f, g : 1 → X with source 1 is a ∆0-atomic
formula.
• A quantifier over a ∆0-variable is a ∆0-quantifier.
• A formula whose only variables are ∆0-variables, whose only atomic subformulas
are ∆0-atomic, and whose only quantifiers are ∆0-quantifiers is a ∆0-formula.
These conventions make doing mathematics in a structural set theory sound
much more familiar. They also make it sound very much like the internal logic of
a category S. Recall that the latter is a type theory with types for all objects of S,
function symbols for all arrows in S, and relation symbols for all monics in S. The
following lemma makes this correspondence precise.
Lemma 3.15. For any Heyting category S, there is a canonical bijection (up to
provable equivalence) between
(a) ∆0-formulas in the language of categories with parameters in S, and
(b) formulas in the internal first-order logic of S.
18 MICHAEL A. SHULMAN
Proof. Given a ∆0-formula as in (a), we construct a formula in the internal logic
by following formally the informal description in 3.14. Note that every arrow-term
1→ X must be constructed as a composite of some number of parameters, possibly
beginning with a single ∆0-variable. (The possibility of nontrivial terms of type
1 → 1 can be excluded, up to provable equivalence.) Thus, any such term such
as f ◦ (g ◦ x) : 1 → X can be represented by a term f(g(x)) : X in the internal
logic. Similarly, ∆0-atomic formulas give atomic equalities between such terms, and
connectives and ∆0-quantifiers translate in the obvious way.
In the other direction, we have to do a little more work because the internal
logic usually includes function-symbols of higher arity, corresponding to arrows in S
whose domain is a cartesian product. Whenever a term such as f(t1, t2) : Y occurs,
for terms t1 : X1 and t2 : X2 and an arrow f : X1×X2 → Y in S, in the translation
we introduce a new ∆0-variable z : 1→ X1 ×X2 (in addition to those occurring in
t1 and t2), represent f(t1, t2) by f ◦ z, and carry along an extra stipulation that
p1 ◦ z = t1 and p2 ◦ z = t2, where pi : X1 ×X2 → Xi are the product projections
in S. This extra condition has then to be placed at an appropriate point in the
resulting formula, but this process is familiar from the procedure of definitional
extensions in first-order logic.
The translation of atomic equalities between terms is obvious, but the internal
logic includes relation symbols of arbitrary arity, with corresponding atomic for-
mulas such as R(x1, x2). However, such an atomic formula can be replaced by the
∆0-formula (∃z ∈ R)(p1(z) = x1 ∧ p2(z) = x2), where pi : R → Xi are the jointly
monic projections of the relation R in S. Thus we can translate all atomic formulas,
and the extension to connectives and quantifiers is straightforward. 
Remark 3.16. Note that in the translation of function symbols of higher arity, the
object X1 ×X2 is now a parameter of the resulting ∆0-formula, as are p1 and p2.
Thus, we actually have to choose some particular cartesian product of X1 and X2
in S. If S doesn’t come with “specified” products, then this requires some axiom of
choice to define the entire bijective correspondence. But we will only need to apply
the correspondence to particular formulas or finite sets of formulas, in which case
there is no problem since we only need to make finitely many choices.
From now on we will identify the two types of formulas whose equivalence is
shown in Lemma 3.15. The following observation shows that not only do the for-
mulas themselves correspond, so do their “extensions,” in the senses appropriate to
the internal logic and to structural set theory respectively.
Proposition 3.17. Let S be a category with finite limits in which 1 is a strong
generator. Then the following are equivalent.
(i) S is a constructively well-pointed Heyting category.
(ii) S satisfies the schema of ∆0-separation: for any ∆0-formula ϕ(x) with
free variable x : 1→ X, there exists a subobject S  X such that any map
x : 1→ X factors through S if and only if ϕ(x) holds.
Proof. Assuming (i), and given a ∆0-formula ϕ as in (ii), we construct S as the
usual “interpretation” in the internal logic of S of the formula corresponding to
ϕ under Lemma 3.15. That is, we build S by induction on the structure of ϕ,
using intersections, unions, images, dual images, and so on in S. That this satisfies
the required property also follows from an inductive argument. The cases of >
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and ∧ are clear, while ⇒ and ∀ follow from the assumption that 1 is a strong
generator. Finally, the cases of ∃, ∨, and ⊥ use the projectivity, indecomposability,
and nonemptiness of 1, respectively.
Conversely, assume ∆0-separation (ii) and that 1 is a strong generator. The
argument of Lemma 3.11(ii) still applies to show that a morphism is monic iff it is
injective on global elements. Let M denote the class of monics and E the class of
morphisms that are surjective on global elements. Because 1 is a strong generator,
any morphism in E is extremal epic (i.e. factors through no proper subobject of its
codomain). Moreover, E is evidently stable under pullback.
For any map f : Y → X , apply ∆0-separation to the formula (∃y ∈ Y )(f(y) = x)
to obtain a monic m : S  X . The pullback of m along f is a monic which is
bijective on global elements, hence an isomorphism; thus f factors through m, and
the factorization e : Y → S is in E by construction. Therefore, (E ,M) is a pullback-
stable factorization system, from which it follows that S is a regular category and
that E is exactly the class of regular epics—and hence 1 is projective.
Now given monics m : A  X and n : B  X , apply ∆0-separation to the
formula (∃a ∈ A)(m(a) = x) ∨ (∃b ∈ B)(n(b) = x) to obtain a monic S  X .
Lemma 3.11(iii) still applies to show that A ⊆ S and B ⊆ S and that if A ⊆ T and
B ⊆ T then S ⊆ T ; thus S = A∪B. The defining property of S (it contains precisely
those 1 → X factoring through either A or B) is evidently stable under pullback.
Similarly, from the formula ϕ(x) = ⊥ we obtain a pullback-stable bottom element
0 X , so S is a coherent category. Moreover, by the construction of unions and
empty subobjects, it follows that 1 is indecomposable and nonempty. Finally, dual
images can similarly be constructed by applying ∆0-separation to a formula with
a universal ∆0-quantifier. 
Thus, the definition of a constructively well-pointed Heyting category, though it
may seem categorically technical, is equivalent to a very natural structural analogue
of the ∆0-separation axiom.
Remark 3.18. If S is a Π-pretopos or a topos, then the direction (b)→(a) of
Lemma 3.15 can be extended to formulas in the appropriate higher-order logic in-
volving dependent product types and/or power types, analogously to how we dealt
with finite products, by choosing appropriate objects in S to introduce as extra
parameters. Therefore, the direction (i)→(ii) of Proposition 3.17 can be applied to
such formulas as well. We will need this generalization in what follows. Unfortu-
nately, it seems difficult to precisely describe a class of formulas in the language
of structural set theory which would satisfy higher-order versions of Lemma 3.15
and Proposition 3.17. This can be remedied by describing structural set theory as
a type theory with quantification over types, as mentioned in footnote 2 on page 4.
4. Structural separation, fullness, and induction
There are several axioms from material set theory for which we have not yet
considered structural versions. In this section, we consider separation, fullness, and
induction; in the next we consider collection and replacement.
The structural separation axiom simply generalizes Proposition 3.17(ii) to un-
bounded quantifiers.
• Separation: For any formula ϕ(x), pfor any set X , there exists a subobject S  X
such that for any x ∈ X , we have x ∈ S if and only if ϕ(x)q.
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Lemma 4.1. If V satisfies the core axioms together with full separation, then
Set(V) satisfies separation.
Proof. Note that any formula ϕ in Set(V) in the language of categories may be
translated into a formula ϕ̂ in V in the language of material set theory. Moreover,
if ϕ is ∆0, then so will ϕ̂ be. Now, if V satisfies material separation, it is easy to see
that S = { x ∈ X | ϕ̂(x) } has the desired property for structural separation. 
The structural axiom of fullness is also a direct translation of the material one.
• Fullness: pfor any sets X,Y there exists a relation R  M × X × Y such that
RM ×X is regular epic, and for any relation S  X × Y such that S  X is
regular epic, there exists an s ∈M such that (s, 1)∗R ⊆ Sq.
Lemma 4.2. If V satisfies the core axioms together with fullness, then Set(V)
satisfies structural fullness.
Proof. Just like the proofs for exponentials and power sets in Theorem 3.5. 
Remark 4.3. The axiom of fullness appears quite different from our statements
of the structural axioms of exponentiation and powersets in §3. Specifically, the
former refers explicitly to global elements and is thus only suitable in a well-pointed
category, while the latter are phrased in a more “category-theoretic” way that makes
sense in more generality.
In fact, however, in a well-pointed category, the existence of power objects is
easily shown to be equivalent to the following more “set-like” version: for any X
there is an object PX and a relation RX  X × PX such that for any subset
S  X , there exists a unique s ∈ PX such that S ∼= (1, s)∗RX . This is also true
for exponentiation as long as we also assume the collection axioms from the next
section. Conversely, from our axiom of fullness one can derive a more category-
theoretic version by interpreting it in the stack semantics. So the difference is only
an artifact of our chosen presentations.
The axiom of induction, of course, only makes sense in the presence of the axiom
of infinity. The structural axiom of infinity (existence of an nno) asserts that
functions can be constructed by recursion, which implies Peano’s induction axiom
in the sense that any subset S  N which contains o : 1→ N and is closed under
s : N → N must be all of N . (The proof of Theorem 3.5(v) essentially shows that
the converse holds in any Π-pretopos.) It follows from ∆0-separation that ∆0-
formulas can be proven by induction; the axiom of full induction extends this to
arbitrary formulas.
• Induction: For any formula ϕ(x) with free variable x ∈ N , where N is an nno,
pif ϕ(0) and (∀n ∈ N)(ϕ(x)⇒ ϕ(sx)), then ϕ(x) for all x ∈ Nq.
Just as in material set theory, infinity and full separation together imply full in-
duction. We also have:
Proposition 4.4. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory, and also
the axioms of infinity, exponentials, and induction, then Set(V) has an nno and
satisfies induction.
Proof. Any formula ϕ(x) in Set(V) with x ∈ N = ω can be rewritten as a formula
in V, to which the material axiom of induction can be applied. 
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There is no particularly natural structural “axiom of foundation,” although in
§6 we will mention a somewhat related property. We can, however, formulate a
structural axiom which is closely related to the material axiom of set-induction.
• Well-founded induction: For any formula ϕ(x) with free variable x ∈ A, pif A is
well-founded under the relation ≺, and moreover if ϕ(y) for all y ≺ x implies ϕ(x),
then in fact ϕ(x) for all x ∈ Aq.
This axiom is implied by separation, since then we can form { x ∈ A | ϕ(x) } and
apply the definition of well-foundedness. We can also say:
Proposition 4.5. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory, and also
the axioms of power set, set-induction, and Mostowski’s principle, then Set(V)
satisfies well-founded induction.
Proof. With power sets, any well-founded relation can be collapsed to a well-
founded extensional one (an “extensional quotient” in the sense of §6), which by
Mostowski’s principle will be isomorphic to a transitive set. Thus, set-induction
performed over the resulting transitive set can be used for inductive proofs over the
original well-founded relation. 
5. Structural collection and replacement
We now turn to structural versions of the collection and replacement axioms.
Various such axioms have been proposed in the context of ETCS (see [Col73, Osi74,
Law05, McL04]), but none of these seem to be quite appropriate in an intuition-
istic or predicative theory. Hence our axioms must be different from all previous
proposals (though they are most similar to the replacement axiom of [McL04]).
The intuition behind structural collection is that since the elements of a set in
a structural theory are not themselves sets, instead of “collecting” sets as elements
of another set we must collect them as a family indexed over another set. Also,
since the language of category theory is two-sorted, it is unsurprising that we have
to assert collection for objects and morphisms separately. In fact, we find it con-
ceptually helpful to formulate three axioms of collection, although the third one is
automatically satisfied.
• Collection of sets: For any formula ϕ(u,X), pfor any set U , if for every u ∈ U
there exists an X with ϕ(u,X), then there exists a regular epi V
p
−− U and an
A ∈ Set/V such that for every v ∈ V we have ϕ(pv, v∗A)q.
• Collection of functions: For any formula ϕ(u, f), pfor any set U and any A,B ∈
Set/U , if for all u ∈ U there exists u∗A
f
−→ u∗B with ϕ(u, f), then there exists a
regular epi V
p
−− U and a function p∗A
g
−→ p∗B in Set/V such that for all v ∈ V ,
we have ϕ(pv, v∗g)q.
• Collection of equalities: pFor any set U , any A,B ∈ Set/U , and any functions
f, g : A → B in Set/U , if u∗f = u∗g for every u ∈ U , then there is a regular epi
V
p
−− U such that p∗f = p∗g.q
We will say that Set “satisfies collection” if it satisfies all three of these axioms.
However, one, and sometimes two, of these are redundant.
Proposition 5.1. Let Set be a constructively well-pointed Heyting category. Then:
(i) Set satisfies collection of equalities.
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(ii) If Set satisfies full separation and is a Π-pretopos, then it satisfies collection
of functions.
Proof. In the situation of collection of equalities, let E
e
−→ A be the equalizer of f
and g and let S = ∀aE, where A
a
−→ U is the structure map of A ∈ Set/U . The
assumption that u∗f = u∗g for every 1
u
−→ U implies that every such u factors
through S. Since 1 is a strong generator, this implies S ∼= U , and therefore E ∼= A
and so f = g; thus we can take V = U and p = 1U . This shows (i).
In the situation of (ii), let C = (B → U)(A→U) be the exponential in Set/U , with
projection C
g
−→ U . Then each c ∈ C corresponds to a map fc : (gc)∗A→ (gc)∗B.
Using the axiom of separation, find a subobject V
m
−→ C such that c ∈ C is
contained in V iff ϕ(fc). By assumption, every u ∈ U lifts to some c ∈ V , so since
Set is well-pointed, the projection V
gm
−− U is regular epi. Finally, there is an
evident map h : (gm)∗A→ (gm)∗B such that ϕ(gmc, c∗h) for all c ∈ V . 
The appropriate structural formulation of the axiom of replacement is a bit
more subtle than that of collection. The idea is that if we modify the hypotheses of
collection by asserting unique existence, then passage to a cover V  U should be
unnecessary. As with collection, we may expect three versions for sets, functions
and equalities, and of these the second two are easy and follow from collection.
Proposition 5.2. Let Set be a constructively well-pointed Heyting category.
(i) Set always satisfies replacement of equalities: pfor any set U , any A,B ∈
Set/U , and any functions f, g : A→ B in Set/U , if u∗f = u∗g for every u ∈ U ,
then f = gq.
(ii) If Set satisfies collection of functions, then it satisfies replacement of func-
tions: pfor any set U and any A,B ∈ Set/U , if for every 1
u
−→ U there exists
a unique u∗A
f
−→ u∗B such that ϕ(u, f), then there exists A
g
−→ B in Set/U
such that for each 1
u
−→ U we have ϕ(u, u∗f)q.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 5.1(i) already shows (i). For (ii), collection of
functions gives us a regular epimorphism V
p
−− U and a function h : p∗A → p∗B
in Set/V such that ϕ(pv, v∗h) for any v ∈ V . If (r, s) : V ×U V ⇒ V is the kernel
pair of p, then for every z = (v1, v2) ∈ V ×U V we have pv1 = pv2 = u, say, and
thus ϕ(u, v∗1h) and ϕ(u, v
∗
2h). By uniqueness, v
∗
1h = v
∗
2h, and so
z∗r∗h = v∗1h = v
∗
2h = z
∗s∗h.
By replacement of equalities, r∗h = s∗h. So since the self-indexing of Set is a
prestack, h descends to g : A → B with p∗g = h. Since p is regular epic, for any
u ∈ U there exists a v ∈ V with pv = u, so we have u∗h = v∗p∗h = v∗g, whence
ϕ(u, u∗h). 
These two replacement axioms imply, in particular, that universal properties are
reflected by global elements. Rather than give a precise statement of this, we present
a paradigmatic example.
Proposition 5.3. Let Set be a constructively well-pointed Heyting category satisfy-
ing replacement of equalities and functions, and suppose we have A,B,E ∈ Set/X
and a morphism v : E ×X A→ B such that for all x ∈ X, x∗v exhibits x∗E as an
exponential (x∗B)(x
∗A) in Set. Then v exhibits E as an exponential BA in Set/X.
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Proof. The assumption means that for any object C and any morphism f : C ×
x∗A → x∗B, there exists a unique g : C → x∗E such that f = x∗v ◦ (g × 1). In
particular, given any D ∈ Set/X and morphism f : D×X A→ B, for every x ∈ X
there is a unique gx : x
∗D → x∗E such that x∗f = x∗v ◦ (gx × 1). By replacement
of functions, we have g : D → E such that x∗f = x∗v ◦ (x∗g × 1) for each x ∈ X ,
or equivalently x∗f = x∗(v ◦ (g× 1)). By replacement of equalities, f = v ◦ (g× 1).
Moreover, if f = v ◦ (h × 1) for some h : D → E, then for each x ∈ X we have
x∗f = x∗v ◦ (x∗h× 1). By the universal property of the exponential x∗E, we have
x∗h = gx = x
∗g, and hence h = g by replacement of equalities. 
In future, we will invoke similar facts frequently, trusting the reader to supply
analogous arguments as necessary. Note also that all universal properties reflected
in this way are automatically pullback-stable.
We would also like an axiom of “replacement of sets,” which would ensure that
the existence of an object satisfying a universal property is also reflected by global
elements. Since no structural theory can determine an object of a category more
uniquely than up to unique isomorphism, one natural such statement would be:
• Replacement of sets: pif for every u ∈ U there is a set A with ϕ(u,A) which is
unique up to unique isomorphism, then there is a B ∈ Set/U such that ϕ(u, u∗B)
for all u ∈ Uq.
If Set is additionally exact, then replacement of sets follows from collection, using
the fact that in this case the self-indexing Set/(−) a stack for the regular topology.
Moreover, just as in material set theory, we have:
Proposition 5.4. If S is a well-pointed Heyting category which satisfies full clas-
sical logic and replacement of sets, then it also satisfies separation.
Proof. For any formula ϕ with a free variable 1
x
−→ X , let ψ(x,A) be pA is terminal
and ϕ(x), or A is initial and ¬ϕ(x)q. Since (∀x)(ϕ(x) ∨ ¬ϕ(x)) holds by classical
logic, and initial and terminal objects are unique up to unique isomorphism, we can
apply replacement of sets to obtain a a B ∈ Set/X such that for any x ∈ X , if ϕ(x)
then x∗B is terminal, while if ¬ϕ(x) then x∗B is initial. It follows that B → X is
monic, and is the subobject classifying ϕ required by the separation axiom. 
However, for most other purposes replacement of sets is basically useless, since
hardly ever is a set determined up to absolutely unique isomorphism, only an iso-
morphism which is compatible with some additional functions whose existence is
being asserted at the same time. For example, a cartesian product A × B is only
determined up to an isomorphism which is unique such that it respects the projec-
tions A × B → A and A × B → B with which the product comes equipped. In
order to state a useful version of replacement, we invoke the notion of context from
dependent type theory (which also simplifies greatly in our particular situation).
Definition 5.5. Let S be a category.
(i) A context Γ in S is a finite (ordered) list of typed variables, with the property
that whenever an arrow-variable f : X → Y occurs in Γ, each of X and Y is
either a parameter, or an object-variable occurring in Γ prior to f .
(ii) A instantiation ~A of a context Γ in S is a well-typed assignation of objects
and arrows in S to the variables of Γ. We write ~A : Γ and use the notations
X 7→ XA and (f : Y → Z) 7→ (fA : YA → ZA), where if Y or Z is a parameter
then YA or ZA denotes simply that parameter.
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(iii) A morphism of instantiations ~A→ ~B consists of
(a) For each object-variable X in Γ, a morphism αX : XA → XB, such that
(b) For each arrow-variable f : X → Y in Γ, we have αY ◦ fA = fB ◦ αX .
Here if X or Y is a parameter, then αX or αY denotes the identity arrow
of that parameter.
(iv) If (Γ,∆) is a context (meaning the concatenation of Γ and ∆), and ~A is an
instantiation of Γ, then an extension of ~A to ∆ is a ~B such that ( ~A, ~B) is an
instantiation of ∆. Similarly we define extensions of morphisms.
Of course, instantiations of a given, fixed, context can be discussed (and quanti-
fied over) in the language of categories over S. If ϕ is a formula whose free variables
are those in the context Γ, we write ϕ(Γ), and similarly ϕ( ~A) for the instantiation
of ϕ with these variables replaced by the parameters in ~A. The pullback of contexts
and instantiations along a morphism p : V → U is defined in the obvious way.
As a particularly important example, the context (X, x : 1→ X) can be instan-
tiated in Set/U by the pair (U∗U,∆U ) consisting of the object U
∗U = U × U and
the morphism ∆U : 1U → U∗U . Moreover, this pair is the universal such instanti-
ation over U , in that for any u : 1 → U we have an isomorphism of instantiations
u∗(U∗U,∆U ) ∼= (U, u). Similarly, for any V
p
−→ U we can consider (V ∗U, (1V , p)),
which has the analogous property that v∗(V ∗U, (1V , p)) ∼= (U, pv) for any v : 1→ V .
Proposition 5.6. Any constructively well-pointed Heyting category satisfying col-
lection also satisfies collection of contexts: for any context (X, x : 1 → X,Γ) and
any formula ϕ(X, x,Γ), pfor any set U , if for every u ∈ U there exists ~A : Γ extending
(U, u) such that ϕ(U, u, ~A), then there exists a regular epi V
p
−− U and a ~B : Γ
extending (V ∗U, (1V , p)) in Set/V such that for every v ∈ V we have ϕ(U, pv, v
∗ ~B)q.
Proof. Simply apply collection of sets and functions repeatedly, using the fact that
regular epimorphisms compose. 
We can now improve “replacement of sets” to a more useful axiom.
• Replacement of contexts: for any context (X, x : 1 → X,Γ) and any formula
ϕ(X, x,Γ), pfor any set U , if for every u ∈ U there is an extension ~A : Γ of
(U, u) such that ϕ(U, u, ~A), and moreover ~A is unique up to a unique isomorphism
of instantiations extending 1U , then there is an extension ~B : Γ of (U
∗U,∆U ) in
Set/U such that ϕ(U, u, u∗ ~B) for all u ∈ Uq.
Proposition 5.7. Any constructively well-pointed Heyting pretopos satisfying col-
lection also satisfies replacement of contexts.
Proof. By Proposition 5.6, there is a regular epi p : V  U and a ~C : Γ in Set/V
such that for every v ∈ V we have ϕ(U, pv, v∗ ~C). Let (r, s) : V ×U V ⇒ V be
the kernel pair of f , and consider r∗ ~C and s∗ ~C in Set/V ×U V . The assumption
implies that when pulled back along any z : 1→ V ×U V , these two instantiations
of Γ become uniquely isomorphic. Thus, by replacement of functions and equalities
applied some finite number of times, we actually have a unique isomorphism r∗ ~C ∼=
s∗ ~C in Set/V ×U V . Uniqueness implies that this isomorphism satisfies the cocycle
condition over V ×U V ×U V . Thus, since Set is a stack for its regular topology
(applied some finite number of times), the entire instantiation ~C : Γ descends to
some ~B : Γ in Set/U . Since p is surjective, the desired property for ~B follows. 
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In general, it seems that replacement of contexts does not imply collection, al-
though we do not have a counterexample. As in material set theory, however,
replacement suffices in the classical world.
Proposition 5.8. Over ETCS, the following are equivalent.
(i) Replacement of contexts.
(ii) Collection of sets.
(iii) Full separation and collection (of both sets and functions).
Proof. By Propositions 5.1(ii), 5.4, and 5.7, it suffices to prove that replacement
of contexts implies collection of sets. Given a formula ϕ(u,X), we can construct
a context Γ including both a set X and a binary relation on it, and let ψ(u,Γ)
assert that ϕ(u,X) holds and that the given relation is a well-ordering, which
has the smallest possible order-type among well-ordered sets X such that ϕ(u,X).
Since classically, any set admits a smallest well-ordering which is unique up to
unique isomorphism, we can apply replacement of contexts to ψ and thereby deduce
collection of sets. 
As promised, replacement of contexts implies that the existence of objects satis-
fying a universal property is reflected by global elements. Continuing the example
of Proposition 5.3, we have the following.
Proposition 5.9. Let Set be a constructively well-pointed Heyting pretopos satis-
fying collection. If Set is cartesian closed, then it is locally cartesian closed.
Proof. Let A,B ∈ Set/X ; we want to construct the exponential (B → X)(A→X).
For x ∈ X , let ϕ(x,E, e) assert that e : E×x∗A→ x∗B exhibits E as the exponential
(x∗B)x
∗A. This formula can be phrased as ψ(X, x,Γ) for some Γ, although we note
that Γ involves not just E and e but also object-variables for x∗A, x∗B, and E×x∗A,
and arrow-variables giving the projections that exhibit these as two pullbacks and
a cartesian product, respectively.
Now, since Set is cartesian closed, for every x ∈ X there exists E and e with
ϕ(x,E, e), and such are unique up to a unique isomorphism which respects all
the structure. Therefore, replacement of contexts supplies an instantiation of Γ
extending (X∗X,∆X) in Set/X . This consists essentially of an object C and a
morphism c : C ×X A→ B. The conclusion of replacement of contexts implies that
C and c satisfy the hypotheses of Proposition 5.3, so they must be an exponential
(B → X)(A→X) as desired. 
This is of course reminiscent of the way in which local cartesian closure comes
“for free” in Theorem 3.5(i). We end this section by extending Theorem 3.5 to the
axiom of collection.
Theorem 5.10. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory along with
collection, then Set(V) also satisfies collection.
Proof. If V satisfies material collection, then given the setup of collection of sets
for some formula ϕ, let ψ(u,X) assert that X is a Kuratowski ordered pair of the
form (u,X ′) with ϕ(u,X ′). By material collection, let V be a set such that for any
u ∈ U , there is an X ∈ V with ψ(u,X), and for any X ∈ V , there is a u ∈ U with
ψ(u,X). Then every element of V is an ordered pair whose first element is in U ,
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so there is a projection V → U , which by assumption is surjective. We can then
form B =
⋃
(u,X′)∈V X
′, and by ∆0-separation cut out
A = { ((u,X ′), a) ∈ V ×B | a ∈ X ′ } .
Then A ∈ Set(V)/V , and for any v = (u,X ′) ∈ V , v∗A is isomorphic to X ′. Thus,
by isomorphism-invariance, we have ϕ(u, v∗A), as required. Collection of functions
is analogous. 
The material axiom of replacement, however, does not seem to imply the struc-
tural one. This, we feel, is one of the reasons (though not the only one) that the
material axiom of collection is necessary in practice.
6. Constructing material set theories
So far we have summarized the axioms of material set theory and structural
set theory, and explained how most axioms of material set theory are reflected in
structural properties of the resulting category of sets. We now turn to the opposite
construction: how to recover a material set theory from a structural one. A “set”
in material set theory, of course, contains much more information than a “set” in
structural set theory, namely the membership relations between its elements, their
elements, and so on. This gives rise to the idea of modeling a “material set” by a
graph or tree with nodes depicting sets and edges depicting membership.
This basic idea was used by [Col73, Mit72, Osi74] in the first equiconsistency
proofs of ETCS with BZC, and nearly identical constructions have been used for
relative consistency proofs by others such as [Acz88] and [Mat01]. We are not aware
of an exposition at our required level of generality, though. The constructions are
the same as always, though, as long as we are careful about the definitions.
For the rest of this section, let Set be a constructively well-pointed Π-pretopos
with an nno.
Definitions 6.1.
(i) A graph is a set X , whose elements are called nodes, equipped with a binary
relation ≺.
(ii) If x ≺ y we say that x is a child of y.
(iii) A pointed graph is one equipped with a distinguished node ? called the root.
(iv) A pointed graph is accessible if for every node x there exists a path x =
xn ≺ · · · ≺ x0 = ? to the root.
(v) For any node x of a graph X , we write X/x for the full subgraph of X
consisting of those y admitting some path to x. It is, of course, pointed by x,
and accessible.
“Accessible pointed graph” is abbreviated apg.
Remark 6.2. The hypothesis on Set is necessary to formalize “accessibility” and
to define X/x. Specifically, a pointed graph X≺  X ×X with root ? : 1 → X is
accessible if for every x : 1→ X , there exists a nonzero finite cardinal [n] and a map
[n]→ X≺ realizing a path from x to ?. (Recall that a finite cardinal is the pullback
along a map 1 → N of the second projection N< → N of the strict order relation
on the nno.) The definition of X/x is similar, using the extension of ∆0-separation
to functions described in Remark 3.18.
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We are using the terminology of [Acz88]. The idea is that an arbitrary graph
represents a collection of material-sets with ≺ representing the membership relation
between them, a pointed graph represents a particular set (the root) together with
all the data required to describe its hereditary membership relation, and an apg
does this without any superfluous data (all the nodes bear some relation to the
root). Thus, an arbitrary apg can be considered a picture of a possibly non-well-
founded set: the root represents the set itself, its children represent the elements of
the set, and so on.
We will henceforth restrict attention to graphs for which ≺ is well-founded,
thereby ensuring that the models of material set theory we construct satisfy the
axiom of foundation. It is also possible, by changing this requirement, to construct
models satisfying the various axioms of anti-foundation (see [Acz88]), but we will
not do that here. Recall the definition:
Definition 6.3. A subset S of a graph X is inductive if for any node x ∈ X , if
all children of x are in S, then x is also in S. A graph X is well-founded if any
inductive subset of X is equal to all of X .
In the presence of classical logic, well-foundedness is equivalent to saying that
every nonempty subset of X has a ≺-least element, but in intuitionistic logic that
version is both fairly useless and rarely satisfied.
With the above definition of well-foundedness, we can perform proofs by in-
duction on a well-founded graph: by proving that a given subset is inductive, we
conclude it is the whole graph. In order to prove a statement by well-founded in-
duction, we must apply separation to the statement to turn it into a subset; thus
either the statement must be ∆0 or we must have a stronger separation axiom. We
can also use well-founded induction in more than one variable, since if X and Y
are well-founded then so is X × Y .
We record some observations about well-founded graphs.
Lemma 6.4. Any subset of a well-founded graph is well-founded with the induced
relation.
Proof. For any Z ⊆ X , if S ⊆ Z is inductive in Z, then the Heyting implication
(Z ⇒ S) ⊆ X is inductive in X . 
Lemma 6.5. If X is a well-founded graph, then there does not exist any cyclic
path x = xn ≺ · · · ≺ x0 = x in X.
Proof. If there were, then the Heyting complement of {x0, . . . , xn} ⊆ X would be
inductive but not all of X . 
Lemma 6.6. If X is a well-founded graph and x ∈ X, then x : 1 → X/x is a
complemented subobject. In particular, it is decidable whether or not a node of a
well-founded apg is the root.
Proof. By definition, every node y ∈ X/x admits some path to x, of length n ∈ N
say. Since 0 is a complemented subobject of N , either n = 0, in which case y = x,
or n > 0. If n > 0, then if x = y there would be a cyclic path from x to itself; hence
in this case x 6= y. Thus for all y, either y = x or y 6= x, as desired. 
Definition 6.7. We will write Xx for the complement of x in X/x, i.e. the set of
nodes admitting a path to x of length > 0. In particular, X? is the complement
of the root.
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We need one more requirement on our apgs, namely that they satisfy the axiom
of extensionality.
Definition 6.8. An graph X is extensional if whenever x and y are nodes such
that z ≺ x⇔ z ≺ y for all z, then x = y.
For non-well-founded graphs, this definition would have to be strengthened in
one of various possible ways.
Remark 6.9. An equivalent characterization of the universe of extensional well-
founded apgs can be obtained by working with well-founded rigid trees instead. A
tree is an apg in which every node x admits a unique path to the root, and it is
rigid if for any node z and any children x ≺ z and y ≺ z, if X/x ∼= X/y, then x = y.
Every extensional well-founded apg X has an “unfolding” into a well-founded rigid
tree Xt, whose nodes are the paths in X , and conversely every well-founded rigid
tree is the unfolding of some extensional well-founded apg. Rigid trees are used
by [Col73, Mit72] and [MLM94], while extensional relations are used by [Osi74]
and [Joh77], but they result in essentially equivalent theories. (In the non-well-
founded case, however, extensional relations seem more generally applicable than
rigid trees.)
We now record some observations about extensionality and its interaction with
well-foundedness.
Definition 6.10. An initial segment of a graph X is a subset Y ⊆ X such that
x ≺ y ∈ Y implies x ∈ Y .
Lemma 6.11. Any initial segment of an extensional graph is extensional with the
induced relation. 
Lemma 6.12. If X is a well-founded extensional graph and X/x ∼= X/y, then
x = y.
Proof. We prove this by well-founded induction. If g : X/x ∼−→ X/y, then for all
x′ ≺ x we have X/x′ ∼= X/g(x′), where g(x′) ≺ y; hence by induction x′ = g(x′).
Similarly, we have y′ = g−1(y′) for all y′ ≺ y. By extensionality, x = y. 
In the language of [Acz88], Lemma 6.12 says that well-founded extensional graphs
are “Finsler-extensional.”
Lemma 6.13. Any automorphism of a well-founded extensional graph is the iden-
tity. Therefore, any two parallel isomorphisms of well-founded extensional graphs
are equal.
Proof. Let f : X ∼−→ X be an isomorphism; we prove by well-founded induction
that f(x) = x for all x ∈ X . But if f(x′) = x′ for all x′ ≺ x, then extensionality
immediately implies f(x) = x. 
Definition 6.14. We write V(Set) for the class of well-founded extensional apgs
in Set.
Our goal is now to show that V(Set) is a model of a material set theory. We
consider two apgs to be equal, i.e. to represent the same material-set, when they
are isomorphic. And we model the membership relation ∈ in the expected way:
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Definition 6.15. If X is an apg, the children of its root are called its members.
We write |X | for the set of members of X . If X and Y are apgs, we write X  Y
to mean that X ∼= Y/y for some member y ∈ |Y |.
Here is our omnibus theorem.
Theorem 6.16. Let Set be a constructively well-pointed Π-pretopos with a nno,
and let ϕ be a formula of material set theory with parameters in V(Set). Then
V(Set)  ϕ whenever any of the following holds.
• ϕ is the axiom of extensionality, empty set, pairing, union, exponentiation, in-
finity, foundation, transitive closures, Mostowski’s principle, or an instance of
∆0-separation.
• Set satisfies structural fullness and ϕ is material fullness.
• Set is a topos and ϕ is the power set axiom.
• Set satisfies structural separation and ϕ is an instance of material separation.
• Set satisfies structural collection and ϕ is an instance of material collection.
• Set satisfies replacement of contexts and ϕ is an instance of material replace-
ment.
• Set is Boolean and ϕ is an instance of ∆0-classical logic.
• Set satisfies full classical logic and ϕ is an instance of full classical logic.
• Set satisfies induction and ϕ is an instance of full induction.
• Set satisfies the axiom of choice and ϕ is the material axiom of choice.
• Set satisfies well-founded induction and ϕ is an instance of set-induction.
We will prove this theorem with a series of lemmas, but first we need to introduce
some auxiliary notions leading up to the construction of extensional quotients.
Definition 6.17. LetX and Y be graphs. A simulation fromX to Y is a function
f : X → Y such that
(i) if x′ ≺ x, then f(x′) ≺ f(x), and
(ii) if y ≺ f(x), then there exists an x′ ≺ x with f(x′) = y.
A bisimulation from X to Y is a relation R X × Y such that both projections
R → X and R → Y are simulations (where R is considered as a full subgraph of
X × Y ). A bisimulation is bi-entire if R→ X and R→ Y are surjective.
Note that if f : X → Y is a simulation, then the relation (1, f) : X → X × Y is
a bisimulation, which is bi-entire iff f is surjective.
An obvious example of a simulation is the inclusion of an initial segment. The
following lemma says that for well-founded extensional graphs, these are the only
simulations.
Lemma 6.18. If X is well-founded and extensional, then any simulation f : X →
Y is injective, and isomorphic to the inclusion of an initial segment.
Proof. We show by well-founded induction that f(x1) = f(x2) implies x1 = x2.
Suppose f(x1) = f(x2); then for any z1 ≺ x1, we have f(z1) ≺ f(x1) = f(x2),
so since f is a simulation there is a z2 ≺ x2 with f(z2) = f(z1). Hence z1 = z2
by induction, so z1 ≺ x2. Dually, z2 ≺ x2 implies z2 ≺ x1, so by extensionality
x1 = x2. Finally, any injective simulation must be an initial segment. 
Lemma 6.19. If R is a bi-entire bisimulation from X to Y , then X is well-founded
if and only if Y is so.
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Proof. Suppose X is well-founded and S ⊆ Y is inductive. Let T ⊆ X consist of
those x ∈ X such that R(x, y) implies y ∈ S; we show that T is inductive. Suppose
x ∈ X is such that x′ ≺ x implies x′ ∈ T , and suppose that R(x, y). Then for any
y′ ≺ y there is an x′ ≺ x with R(x′, y′), whence x′ ∈ T and thus y′ ∈ S. So since S
is inductive, y must be in S. Thus x ∈ T , so T is inductive. Since X is well-founded,
T = X , and then since R is bi-entire, S = Y ; thus Y is well-founded. 
Lemma 6.20. Any bi-entire bisimulation between extensional well-founded graphs
must be an isomorphism.
Proof. Let R X×Y be such. We show by well-founded induction that if R(x, y1)
and R(x, y2), then y1 = y2. For if z1 ≺ y1, then since R is a bisimulation, there is
a w ≺ x with R(w, z1), and again since R is a bisimulation, there is a z2 ≺ y2 with
R(w, z2). By induction, z1 = z2, so that z1 ≺ y2 for any z1 ≺ y1. By symmetry, for
any z2 ≺ y2 we have z2 ≺ y1, hence by extensionality y1 = y2.
By symmetry, if R(x1, y) and R(x2, y) then x1 = x2, so R is functional in both
directions. Since it is also bi-entire, it must be an an isomorphism. 
Lemma 6.21. If X is well-founded, then it is extensional if and only if every
bisimulation from X to X is contained in the identity.
Proof. Suppose first that X is well-founded and extensional and that R is a bisim-
ulation with R(x1, x2). Then R is a bi-entire bisimulation from X/x1 to X/x2 (by
ordinary induction on length of paths), so by Lemma 6.20 it must be an isomor-
phism X/x1 ∼= X/x2. But X is well-founded and extensional, so by Lemma 6.12,
x1 = x2.
Now suppose that every bisimulation from X to X is contained in the identity,
and also that x, y ∈ X are such that z ≺ x⇔ z ≺ y for all z. Define R(a, b) to hold
if either a = b, or a = x and b = y. Then R is a bisimulation, and if it is contained
in the identity, then x = y; hence X is extensional. 
In the language of [Acz88], Lemma 6.21 says that for well-founded graphs, ex-
tensionality is equivalent to “strong extensionality.”
Corollary 6.22. If Y is well-founded and extensional, then any two simulations
f, g : X ⇒ Y are equal.
Proof. The image of (f, g) : X → Y × Y is a bisimulation, hence contained in the
identity. 
Therefore, well-founded extensional graphs and simulations form a (large) pre-
order. In the language of material set theory, this preorder represents the partial
order of transitive-sets and subset inclusions.
Lemma 6.23. If X is a graph and R is a bisimulation from X to X which is an
equivalence relation, then its quotient Y inherits a graph structure such that the
quotient map [−] : X  Y is a simulation. Also, if X is an apg, then so is Y .
Proof. Define ≺ on Y to be minimal such that [−] preserves ≺, i.e. y1 ≺ y2 if there
exist x1 ≺ x2 in X with [x1] = y1 and [x2] = y2. Now suppose that y ≺ [x]. By
definition this means that there exist z1 ≺ z2 with [z1] = y and [z2] = [x], i.e.
R(z2, x) holds. But R is a bisimulation, so there exists x
′ ≺ x with R(z1, x′), i.e.
[x′] = y; hence [−] is a simulation. If X is an apg, we define the root of Y to be
[?]; accessibility of Y follows directly from that of X . 
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Of course, by Lemma 6.19, if X is well-founded, then so is the quotient Y . If R is
the largest bisimulation on X , then its quotient is easily verified to be extensional.
The largest bisimulation exists if Set is a topos, or if it satisfies full separation, so in
these situations every well-founded graph has an extensional quotient. In general,
this seems not to be provable, but we can still construct extensional quotients in a
useful amount of generality.
Lemma 6.24. Let n be a fixed external natural number, let X be a well-founded
apg, and assume that X/x is extensional whenever x is a node that admits a path
of length n to the root. Then there is an extensional well-founded apg X and a
surjective simulation q : X → X.
Proof. The proof is by external induction on n. (We will only need this lemma for
n ≤ 3, so the reader is encouraged not to worry too much about what this induction
requires of the metatheory.) The base case is easy: since the root ? admits a path
of length 0 to itself and X ∼= X/?, we can take X = X .
Now suppose the statement is true for some n, and let X satisfy the hypothesis
for n + 1. For any k, write Xk for the set of nodes admitting a path of length
k to the root. Let the relation R on X be defined by R(x, y) if there exists an
isomorphism X/x ∼−→ X/y. (This can be constructed using ∆0-separation and local
exponentials in Set.) Then R is a bisimulation and an equivalence relation, so by
Lemma 6.23 it has a quotient Y which is again a well-founded apg.
We claim that Y satisfies the hypothesis for n. Let y ∈ Yn and suppose that
y1, y2 ∈ Y/y satisfy z ≺ y1 ⇔ z ≺ y2; we must show y1 = y2. Applying the
simulation property inductively, we have y = [x] for x ∈ Xn, and yi = [xi] with
xi ∈ X/x for i = 1, 2. By Lemma 6.6, for each i either xi = x or xi ∈ X/wi for
some wi ≺ x. If x1 = x and x2 = x, then of course y1 = [x1] = [x2] = y2. If
x1 = x and x2 ∈ X/w2 with w2 ≺ x = x2, then there would be a cyclic path in X
from x2 to itself, contradicting Lemma 6.5. Hence the only remaining case is when
xi ∈ X/wi with wi ≺ x for both i = 1, 2.
Now this implies that wi ∈ Xn+1, so eachX/wi is extensional, and thus so is each
X/xi by Lemma 6.11. Therefore, by Lemma 6.18, the quotient map [−] : X → Y
induces an isomorphism X/xi ∼= Y/[xi] = Y/yi. But z ≺ y1 ⇔ z ≺ y2 means that
Y y1 ∼= Y y2, and hence (by Lemma 6.6) also Y/y1 ∼= Y/y2; thus we also have
X/x1 ∼= X/x2. Thus, by definition, R(x1, x2), and so y1 = [x1] = [x2] = y2.
We have shown that Y satisfies the hypothesis for n. Thus it has an extensional
quotient Y , and so the composite X → Y → Y is an extensional quotient of X . 
We can now start verifying the axioms of material set theory.
Lemma 6.25. The axiom of extensionality holds. That is, two well-founded ex-
tensional apgs X and Y are isomorphic iff Z  X ⇔ Z  Y for all Z.
Proof. The “only if” direction is clear, so suppose that Z  X ⇔ Z  Y for all
Z. Then for every x ∈ |X |, we have X/x  Y , hence X/x ∼= Y/y for some y ∈ Y .
By Lemma 6.12, this y must be unique, and conversely as well; hence we have a
bijection g : |X | ∼−→ |Y | such that for any x ∈ |X | there exists an isomorphism
hx : X/x
∼−→ Y/g(x) (which must be unique, by Lemma 6.13). Define a relation R
from X to Y such that R(a, b) holds if:
(i) a = ? and b = ?, or
(ii) there exists x ∈ |X | such that a ∈ X/x, b ∈ Y/g(x), and hx(a) = b.
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Then R is a bi-entire bisimulation, so by Lemma 6.20 it is an isomorphism. 
Lemma 6.26. The axioms of empty set, pairing, and union hold.
Proof. The empty set is represented by the apg with one node and no ≺ relations,
which has no members.
If X and Y are extensional well-founded apgs, let Z = X + Y + 1 with ≺
induced from X and Y along with ?X ≺ ? and ?Y ≺ ?, where ? is the new point
added. Since X and Y are extensional, Z satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma 6.24
with n = 1, and its extensional quotient represents the pair {X,Y }.
Finally, if X is an extensional well-founded apg, let ‖X‖ denote the subset of
those x ∈ X such that x ≺ y ≺ ? for some y, let Y be the subset of X consisting
of those nodes admitting some path to a node in ‖X‖, and define Z = Y + 1 with
≺ inherited from Y and with y ≺ ? for each y ∈ ‖X‖ ⊆ Y , where ? is the new
element added. Then Z satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 6.24 with n = 1, so it
has an extensional quotient, which is the desired union
⋃
X . 
Lemma 6.27. Cartesian products (using Kuratowski ordered pairs) exist in V(Set).
Proof. Let X and Y be well-founded apgs, and consider the set
Z = (X?) + (Y ?) + |X |+ (|X | × |Y |) + (|X | × |Y |) + 1.
For x ∈ |X | we write x for its image in (X?) and x′ for its image in the first copy
of |X |. Similarly, we write y for images in Y ?, (x, y) for images in the first copy
of |X | × |Y |, (x, y)′ for images in the second copy, and ? for the final point. We
define ≺ on Z as follows:
• ≺ on X? and Y ? is induced from X and Y .
• x ≺ x′ for all x ∈ |X |.
• x ≺ (x, y) and y ≺ (x, y) for all y ∈ |Y |.
• x′ ≺ (x, y)′ and (x, y) ≺ (x, y)′ for all x ∈ |X | and y ∈ |Y |.
• (x, y)′ ≺ ? for all x ∈ |X | and y ∈ |Y |.
It is straightforward to verify that Z is then a well-founded apg. Since X and Y are
extensional, Z satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma 6.24 with n = 3. Its extensional
quotient then represents the cartesian product of X and Y . 
Lemma 6.28. V(Set) satisfies the exponentiation axiom.
Proof. If X and Y are extensional well-founded apgs, let Z be their material carte-
sian product as above, and define
W = (Z?) + |Y ||X| + 1
with ≺ induced from Z along with (using the notation of Lemma 6.27) (x, y)′ ≺ f
whenever f(x) = y, and f ≺ ? for any f ∈ |Y ||X|. Then W is a well-founded apg,
and in fact is already extensional; we claim it represents the material function-set.
It is clear that if F  W , then F ∈ V(Set) is a function from X to Y in the
sense of material set theory. Conversely, from any F ∈ V(Set) which is a function
from X to Y , consider the subset of |X | × |Y | determined by those (x, y) such that
the Kuratowski ordered pair {{X/x}, {X/x, Y/y}} is  F . This defines a function
|X | → |Y | in Set, which therefore induces an f ∈ |W | such that F ∼=W/f . 
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Observe that in particular, we have shown that for X,Y ∈ V(Set), there is a
1-1 correspondence between functions |X | → |Y | in Set and isomorphism classes of
apgs F ∈ V(Set) which represent functions from X to Y in the sense of material
set theory. In fact, although V(Set) need not satisfy limited ∆0-replacement, so
that Theorem 3.5 does not apply to it directly, we still have:
Lemma 6.29. The sets and functions in V(Set) form a category Set(V(Set)),
which can naturally be identified with a full subcategory of Set closed under finite
limits, subsets, quotients, and local exponentials. In particular, Set(V(Set)) is a
Π-pretopos.
Proof. We have observed closure under products and non-local exponentials. Clo-
sure under subsets is easy: if U ⊆ |X |, then the sub-graph Y of X consisting of the
root and all nodes admitting a path to U is a well-founded extensional apg with
|Y | ∼= U . This then implies closure under finite limits.
For quotients, if R is an equivalence relation on |X |, let |X |
q
−− Y be the quotient
of |X | by R in Set; then the apg
Z = (X?) + Y + 1,
with ≺ inherited from X along with x ≺ q(x) and y ≺ ? for all x ∈ |X | and y ∈ Y ,
is well-founded and extensional and has |Z| ∼= Y .
Finally, given f : |A| → |B| and g : |X | → |A|, we have the local exponential
h : Πf (g) → |B| in Set, with counit e : Πf (g)×|B| |A| → |X |. Let Z represent the
material cartesian product of A and X as in Lemma 6.27, and consider the apg
W = (Z?) + Πf (g) + 1
with ≺ inherited from Z, along with (x, y)′ ≺ j whenever f(x) = h(j) and e(j, x) =
y, and j ≺ ? for all j ∈ Πf (g). Then W is well-founded and extensional and
|W | ∼= Πf (g); hence Set(V(Set)) is closed under local exponentials. 
We return to verifying the axioms of material set theory.
Lemma 6.30. If Set satisfies structural fullness, then V(Set) satisfies material
fullness.
Proof. Analogously to exponentiation, if RM ×X×Y is a generic set of multi-
valued functions from |X | to |Y |, consider
W = (Z?) +M + 1
with ≺ induced from Z along with (x, y)′ ≺ m if R(m,x, y) and m ≺ ? for all m ∈
M . ThenW is a well-founded apg and satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma 6.24 with
n = 1. Its extensional quotient represents a generic set of multi-valued functions,
by a similar argument as for exponentiation. 
Lemma 6.31. If Set is a topos, then V(Set) satisfies the power set axiom, and
Set(V(Set)) ⊆ Set is a logical subtopos.
Proof. For an extensional well-founded apg X , define
Y = (X?) + P |X |+ ?
with ≺ induced from X along with x ≺ A whenever x ∈ |X |, A ∈ P |X |, and x ∈ A;
and also of course A ≺ ?. This is an extensional well-founded apg that represents
the material power set of X . The second statement is immediate. 
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Lemma 6.32. V(Set) satisfies the axiom of infinity.
Proof. Let ω = N + 1, with ≺ defined to be < on N together with n ≺ ? for all
n ∈ N . This is an extensional well-founded apg which represents the von Neumann
ordinal ω. The infinity axiom follows from the universal property of the nno. 
Lemma 6.33. If Set satisfies the axiom of choice, then so does V(Set).
Proof. Let X be a well-founded extensional apg such that Xx is inhabited for
each x ∈ |X |. If Y ⊆ X × |X | consists of those (y, x) such that y ∈ Xx, then the
projection Y → |X | is surjective, and hence has a section, say s. From s we can
easily construct a material choice function for X . 
Lemma 6.34. Set has transitive closures.
Proof. If X is a well-founded extensional apg, let T = (X?) + 1 with ≺ inherited
from X along with x ≺ ? for all nodes x ∈ X (not just all members). Then T is a
well-founded extensional apg which represents the transitive closure of X . 
Lemma 6.35. Set satisfies Mostowski’s principle.
Proof. Since Set(V(Set)) is closed in Set under finite limits and subsets, any well-
founded extensional graph X constructed in the material set theory V(Set) will
induce such a graph in Set. Therefore, X + 1, with ≺ induced from X along with
x ≺ ? for all nodes x ∈ X , is a well-founded extensional apg, i.e. an object of
V(Set). We then verify that it is transitive and isomorphic to X in V(Set). 
We now turn to the axiom schemata. For these, we need to be able to translate
material formulas into structural ones. There is an obvious way to do this: if ϕ is
a formula in V(Set), we define ϕ in Set as follows:
• We replace the material “equality” symbol = by isomorphism ∼= of apgs.
• We replace the material “membership” symbol ∈ by the relation .
• The connectives are unchanged.
• We replace quantifiers over material-sets by quantifiers over well-founded ex-
tensional apgs. For example, (∃x)ϕ(x) becomes pthere exists a well-founded
extensional apg X such that ϕ(X)q.
It is easy to see that V(Set)  ϕ if and only if Set  ϕ. This translation works
quite well for the schemata involving arbitrary formulas.
Lemma 6.36. If Set satisfies separation, then so does V(Set).
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be a formula and A ∈ V(Set). Using separation, let U ⊆ |A|
consist of precisely those a ∈ A such that ϕ(A/a). Define B to consist of the root
of A together with all nodes admitting a path to some node in U . Then B is a
well-founded extensional apg, and for any C  A we have C  B iff ϕ(C). 
Lemma 6.37. If Set satisfies full classical logic, then so does V(Set).
Proof. Classical logic for Set implies ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ for any formula ϕ in V(Set). 
Lemma 6.38. If Set satisfies collection, then so does V(Set).
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Proof. Suppose that A ∈ V(Set) and that ϕ is a formula such that for any X  A,
there exists a Y ∈ V(Set) with ϕ(X,Y ). This means that for any x ∈ |A|, there
exists a well-founded extensional apg Y such that ϕ(A/x, Y ). By collection in Set,
there is a surjection V
p
−− |A| and a pointed graph B ∈ Set/V (here “pointed”
means we have a section s : V → B over V ) such that for each v ∈ V , v∗B is
a well-founded extensional apg and ϕ(A/p(v), v
∗B). It is easy to show that B,
considered as a graph in Set, is still well-founded. And since B is a graph in Set/V ,
its relation ≺ is fiberwise; thus for each v ∈ V we have B/s(v) ∼= v∗B, which is
therefore extensional and accessible. It follows that B + 1, with s(v) ≺ ? for all
v ∈ V , satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 6.24 with n = 1. Its extensional quotient
is then the set desired by the material collection axiom. 
Lemma 6.39. If Set satisfies replacement of contexts, then V(Set) satisfies ma-
terial replacement.
Proof. Suppose that A ∈ V(Set) and that ϕ is a formula such that for any X  A,
there exists a unique Y ∈ V(Set) with ϕ(X,Y ). Thus, for any x ∈ |A|, there exists
a well-founded extensional apg Y such that ϕ(A/x, Y ), and any two such Y are
isomorphic. Since any such isomorphism is unique by Lemma 6.13, replacement of
contexts in Set supplies a pointed graph B ∈ Set/|A| such that for each x ∈ |A|
we have ϕ(A/x, x
∗B). The extensional quotient of B + 1 then represents the set
desired by material replacement. 
Lemma 6.40. If Set satisfies full induction, then so does V(Set).
Proof. If ϕ(x) is as in the statement of the material induction axiom, then ϕ(X)
is a statement about some X  ω, i.e. X ∈ N . But every X  N is isomorphic to
N/n for a unique n ∈ N , so ϕ(X) is equivalent to a statement ϕ′(n) about some
n ∈ N , which can then be proven by the structural induction axiom. 
Lemma 6.41. If Set satisfies well-founded induction, then V(Set) satisfies set-
induction.
Proof. Just like Lemma 6.40, using induction over the well-founded (extensional)
relation in Set that underlies any object of V(Set). 
The schemata involving ∆0-formulas require a little more work, since if ϕ is ∆0
then ϕ need not be. Thus, we need to define a different translation for ∆0-formulas.
Suppose ϕ is a ∆0-formula in V(Set) with parameters A1, . . . , Ak, each of which is
a well-founded extensional apg. Then
A1 + · · ·+Ak + 1,
with ≺ inherited from the Ai along with ?i ≺ ? for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, satisfies the
hypothesis of Lemma 6.24 with n = 1. Let T be its extensional quotient. We can
now translate ϕ into a ∆0-formula as follows, interpreting material-set variables
not by apgs but by elements of T .
• Each parameter Ai is replaced by [?i] ∈ T .
• The material “equality” symbol = is replaced by equality in T .
• The material “membership” symbol ∈ is replaced by ≺ in T .
• The connectives are unchanged.
• A ∆0-quantifier of the form (∃x ∈ y)ϕ is replaced by a ∆0-quantifier of the form
(∃x ∈ T )(x ≺ y ∧ ϕ). Similarly, (∀x ∈ y)ϕ is replaced by (∀x ∈ T )(x ≺ y ⇒ ϕ).
36 MICHAEL A. SHULMAN
We call the formula produced in this way ϕ∆0 .
Lemma 6.42. ϕ is equivalent to ϕ
∆0
 .
Proof. Lemma 6.12 implies that T/x ∼= T/y if and only if x = y. Similarly, if
T/x  T/y, then T/x ∼= (T/y)/y′ = T/y′ for some y′ ≺ y, whence x = y′ and so
x ≺ y. The converse is easy, so T/x  T/y if and only if x ≺ y. Thus the atomic
formulas correspond, and the connectives evidently do, so it remains to observe that
∆0-quantifiers are adequately represented by quantifiers over T , since by definition
X  T/y if and only if X ∼= T/x for some x ≺ y. 
Lemma 6.43. V(Set) satisfies ∆0-separation.
Proof. Just like Lemma 6.36, but using ϕ∆0 instead of ϕ, and the ∆0-separation
property of Proposition 3.17 instead of the separation axiom. 
Lemma 6.44. V(Set) satisfies foundation.
Proof. For any ∆0-formula ϕ in V(Set) and any well-founded apg X ∈ V(Set),
we can form { x ∈ X | ϕ(X/x) } using ∆0-separation, since ϕ(X/x) ≡ ϕ
∆0
 (x). The
hypothesis on ϕ implies that this is an inductive subset of X , hence all of it. This
implies the desired conclusion, since for every well-founded extensional apg Y there
is another one X with Y  X . 
Lemma 6.45. If Set is Boolean, then V(Set) satisfies ∆0-classical logic.
Proof. For any ∆0-formula ϕ in V(Set), ∆0-separation supplies a subset { ∅ | ϕ } ⊆
{∅}. If this is complemented in Set, then we must have ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 6.16.
Of course, it is natural to ask to what extent the constructions V(−) and Set(−)
are inverse. We have already seen the canonical inclusion Set(V(Set)) ↪→ Set, and
the following is easy to verify.
Lemma 6.46. The inclusion Set(V(Set)) ↪→ Set is an equivalence if and only if
every object of Set can be embedded into some well-founded extensional graph. 
I propose to call this property of Set the axiom of well-founded materialization.
(Other axioms of materialization would arise from using various kinds of non-well-
founded graphs.)
Note that well-founded materialization follows from the axiom of choice, since
then every object can be well-ordered and thus given the structure of an apg
representing a von Neumann ordinal. We remark in passing that this implies that
“all replacement schemata for ETCS are equivalent.”
Proposition 6.47. Let T1 and T2 be axiom schemata for structural set theory such
that for each i = 1, 2,
(i) if V satisfies ZFC, then Set(V) satisfies Ti, and
(ii) if Set satisfies ETCS+Ti, then Set(V) satisfies ZFC.
Then T1 and T2 are equivalent over ETCS.
Proof. Since ETCS includes AC, for any model of ETCS we have Set ' Set(V(Set)).
Thus, if Set  T1, then by (ii) we have Set(V)  ZFC, hence by (i) we have
Set = Set(V(Set))  T2. The converse is the same. 
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We have seen that our axioms of collection and replacement from §5 satisfy (i)
and (ii), so over ETCS they are equivalent to any other such schema. This includes
the replacement axiom of McLarty [McL04], the axiom CRS of Cole [Col73], the
axiom RepT of Osius [Osi74], and the reflection axiom of Lawvere [Law05, Remark
12]. However, our axioms seem to be more appropriate in an intuitionistic context.
Returning to the material-structural comparison, on the other side we have:
Proposition 6.48. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory along with
infinity, exponentials, foundation, and transitive closures, then there is a canon-
ical embedding V → V(Set(V)). This map is an isomorphism if and only if V
additionally satisfies Mostowski’s principle.
Proof. By assumption, any x ∈ V has a transitive closure TC(x), which is a well-
founded extensional graph. If we define Y = TC(x) + 1, with ≺ induced by ∈ on
TC(x) and with z ≺ ? for all z ∈ x, then Y is a well-founded extensional apg, i.e.
an object of V(Set(V)). This construction gives a map V → V(Set(V)), and it is
straightforward to verify that it preserves and reflects membership and equality.
Now if this embedding is an isomorphism, then clearlyVmust satisfy Mostowski’s
principle, since V(Set(V)) does so. Conversely, if V satisfies Mostowski’s principle,
then every X ∈ V(Set(V)) is isomorphic in V to a transitive set, and therefore
equal in V(Set(V)) to something in the image of the embedding. 
Remark 6.49. The theory M0 of [Mat01] consists of the core axioms together with
power sets and full classical logic. If V  M0, then V(Set(V)) is precisely the
model W1 constructed in [Mat01, §2], which satisfies M0 plus regularity, transitive
closures, and Mostowski’s principle, and inherits infinity and choice from V. (In
the presence of classical logic and power sets, the axiom of infinity is unnecessary
for the construction V(−).) In particular, if V  ZBQC, then V(Set(V))  MOST,
while V(Set(V)) ∼= V if we already had V  MOST.
So far we have concentrated on building models of pure sets only. However, we
can also allow an arbitrary set of atoms: we fix some A ∈ Set and modify our
definitions as follows. (The definitions not listed below need no modification.)
• An A-graph is a graph X together with a partial function ` : X ⇀ A, such that
dom(`) is a complemented subobject of X , and if x ≺ y then y /∈ dom(`).
• Isomorphisms between A-graphs are, of course, required to preserve the labeling
functions `.
• An A-graph is A-extensional if
(i) ` is injective on its domain, and
(ii) for any x, y /∈ dom(`), if z ≺ x⇔ z ≺ y for all z then x = y.
• An A-simulation between A-graphs is a simulation f : X → Y such that for
any x ∈ X , if either `(x) or `(f(x)) is defined, then both are, and they are equal.
Note that if an A-graph X is an apg and ? ∈ dom(`), then X can have no nodes
other than the root, so X is simply an element of A. Thus, accessible pointed
A-graphs model atoms themselves in addition to sets that can contain atoms.
It is straightforward to verify that all the above lemmas, and the main theorem,
still hold when extensional well-founded apgs are replaced by A-extensional well-
founded accessible pointed A-graphs. The resulting material set theories, of course,
satisfy the modified axioms for theories with atoms listed at the end of §2.
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7. The stack semantics
We now introduce the stack semantics of a Heyting pretopos S, no longer
assumed to be well-pointed. (In fact, we will work most of the time with a positive
Heyting category, although a few facts require exactness.) In the introduction, we
described two approaches to this semantics: first, as a direct generalization of the
usual Kripke-Joyal semantics, and second, as a fragment of the internal logic of the
category of sheaves or stacks. In this section we will take the first, more explicit,
viewpoint; in §10 we will show how it agrees with the second.
Recall that our goal is to embed the usual internal type theory in a structural
set theory, along the lines of Lemma 3.15. The interpretation of the internal type
theory is usually defined by constructing, for any formula ϕ with (say) one free
variable x of type A (an object of S), a subobject JϕK  A which we think of
as the subset { x ∈ A | ϕ(x) }. This approach is very powerful and flexible—for
instance, it generalizes to the internal logic of any fibered poset—but it seems
inadequate to deal directly with unbounded quantifiers.
Thus, we start instead with the Kripke-Joyal semantics (see e.g. [MLM94, VI.6]),
according to which JϕK  A can be defined indirectly by characterizing the sub-
presheaf S(−, JϕK)  S(−, A), i.e. characterizing which maps U → A factor
through JϕK. The usual construction of JϕK then becomes a proof that this sub-
functor is representable. The stack semantics consists of defining a sub-presheaf
“S(−, JϕK)” for any formula ϕ in a similar way, though it will not in general be
representable. (This also makes the connection with Sh(S) clear, since this sub-
presheaf is in fact a sub-sheaf and thus a genuine subobject in Sh(S).)
If U is an object of S and ϕ is a formula of category theory with parameters in
S/U , we say that ϕ is a formula over U . Note that a formula over 1 is the same
as a formula in S itself. We can think of a formula over U as an assertion taking
place in each fiber. If moreover V
p
−→ U is any map, its pullback p∗ϕ is a formula
over V obtained by replacing each parameter of ϕ by its pullback along p.
Remark 7.1. Since pullbacks are only defined up to isomorphism, the notation p∗ϕ
is, strictly speaking, ambiguous. However, by isomorphism-invariance (Lemmas 3.2
and 7.3(i)), the particular choices made are irrelevant. Moreover, since only a finite
number of choices are ever needed for any particular formula, making such choices
requires no axiom of choice in the metatheory.
Definition 7.2 (The stack semantics). Let S be a positive Heyting category, and
let ϕ be a sentence over U in S. The relation U  ϕ is defined recursively as follows.
(a) U  (f = g) iff in fact f = g.
(>) U  > always.
(⊥) U  ⊥ iff U is an initial object.
(∧) U  (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff U  ϕ and U  ψ.
(∨) U  (ϕ ∨ ψ) iff U = V ∪W , where V
i
−→ U and W
j
−→ U are subobjects
such that V  i∗ϕ and W  j∗ψ.
(⇒) U  (ϕ⇒ ψ) iff for any V
p
−→ U such that V  p∗ϕ, also V  p∗ψ.
(¬) U  ¬ϕ iff U  (ϕ⇒ ⊥).
(∃0) U  (∃X)ϕ(X) iff there is a regular epimorphism V
p
−− U and an object
A ∈ S/V such that V  p∗ϕ(A).
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(∃1) Similarly, U  (∃f : A→ B)ϕ(f) iff there is a regular epimorphism V
p
−− U
and an arrow g : p∗A→ p∗B in S/V such that V  p∗ϕ(g).
(∀0) U  (∀X)ϕ(X) iff for any V
p
−→ U and any object A ∈ S/V , we have
V  p∗ϕ(A).
(∀1) Similarly, U  (∀f : A→ B)ϕ(f), where A and B are objects of S/U , iff for
any V
p
−→ U and any arrow p∗A
j
−→ p∗B in S/V , we have V  p∗ϕ(j).
If ϕ is a formula over 1 (i.e. a formula in S), we say ϕ is valid if 1  ϕ.
We occasionally write U S ϕ if we wish to emphasize the category S. We may
also write V  ϕ instead of V  p∗ϕ if the map p is obvious from context.
We now prove a couple of basic lemmas about the stack semantics.
Lemma 7.3. Let ϕ be a sentence over U in a positive Heyting category S.
(i) If ϕ′ is an isomorph of ϕ, then U  ϕ′ if and only if U  ϕ.
(ii) If U  ϕ, then for any V
p
−→ U we have V  p∗ϕ.
(iii) If V
p
−− U is a regular epimorphism and V  p∗ϕ, then U  ϕ.
(iv) If U is initial, then U  ϕ for any ϕ.
(v) If U = V ∪W with V  ϕ and W  ϕ, then U  ϕ.
Proof. These are all inductions on formulas. (i) is easy, just like Lemma 3.2, and
(ii) needs only the fact that regular epis and unions are stable under pullback and
initial objects are strict (that is, any map V → 0 is an isomorphism). Strictness of
initial objects also immediately implies (iv).
For (iii), >, ⊥, and ∧ are trivial. Atomic formulas, ⇒, and ∀ follow from
pullback-stability of regular epimorphisms. For ∨, we take images, and for ∃, we
just compose regular epis.
(v) is only slightly more involved. Once again, >, ⊥, and ∧ are trivial, while
atomic formulas, ⇒, and ∀ follow from pullback-stability of unions. ∨ is also easy
since unions distribute over themselves. For ∃0, if we have U = V ∪ W with
regular epis V ′  V and W ′  W , and objects X ∈ S/V ′ and Y ∈ S/W ′ such
that V ′  ϕ(X) and W ′  ϕ(Y ), then because coproducts are disjoint and stable,
X + Y ∈ S/(V ′ +W ′) pulls back to X and Y over V and W , respectively; thus by
the inductive hypothesis, V ′ +W ′  ϕ(X + Y ). And V ′ +W ′ → U is regular epic,
so U  (∃X)ϕ(X). The case of ∃1 is analogous. 
We refer to Lemma 7.3(iii), (iv), and (v) as descent of forcing. Collectively,
they say that “forcing descends along finite jointly effective-epimorphic families”.
Lemma 7.4. The usual rules of deduction for intuitionistic logic are sound for .
In other words, if ϕ ` ψ is provable and U  ϕ, then also U  ψ.
Proof. Straightforward verification; see, for instance, [Joh02, D1.3.1] for the axioms
we have to prove. The only slightly nontrivial axioms are the rules for falsity,
disjunction, and existential quantification. The axiom
⊥ ⇒ ϕ
for falsity follows from Lemma 7.3(iv). For the axiom
(ϕ⇒ χ) =⇒ ((ψ ⇒ χ)⇒ ((ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒ χ))
we must check that if U  (ϕ ⇒ χ), U  (ψ ⇒ χ), and U  (ϕ ∨ ψ), then U  χ.
But U  (ϕ ∨ ψ) means U = V ∪W with V  ϕ and W  ψ, while the other
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two hypotheses imply V  χ and W  χ; so U  χ follows by descent of forcing
(Lemma 7.3(v)). Finally, for the axiom
(∀X)(ϕ(X)⇒ ψ) =⇒ ((∃X)ϕ(X)⇒ ψ)
we must check that if U  (∀X)(ϕ(X) ⇒ ψ) and U  (∃X)ϕ(X), then U  ψ.
But U  (∃X)ϕ(X) means we have a regular epimorphism V
p
−− U and A ∈ S/V
with V  p∗ϕ(A). The other assumption then implies that V  p∗ψ, so U  ψ
again follows by descent of forcing (Lemma 7.3(iii)). Quantification over arrows is
identical. 
Now we consider the relationship of the stack semantics to the usual internal
logic, by way of representing objects.
Definition 7.5. Let S be a positive Heyting category and ϕ a sentence in S over U .
We say that a subobject JϕK U represents or classifies ϕ if for any V
p
−→ U ,
V  p∗ϕ ⇐⇒ p factors through JϕK.
Evidently JϕK is unique up to isomorphism, if it exists. As suggested earlier, we
can then prove that the usual constructions used in the internal logic do produce
such classifying subobjects.
Proposition 7.6. Every ∆0-sentence in a positive Heyting category is classified.
Proof. First note that a ∆0-sentence over U can be translated into a ∆0-sentence in
S with one free variable u ∈ U . We interpret parameters in S/U as parameters in S
by ignoring their structure maps to U , while for any (X
f
−→ U) ∈ S/U we modify
the ∆0-quantifiers (∀x ∈ X)ϕ and (∃x ∈ X)ϕ to read instead (∀x ∈ X)((fx =
u) ⇒ ϕ) and (∃x ∈ X)((fx = u) ∧ ϕ). Now we further translate this formula
along the equivalence of Lemma 3.15 to obtain a formula ϕˇ(u) in the usual internal
logic of S, with one free variable u : U . Comparing definitions shows that for any
p : V → U , we have V  p∗ϕ in the stack semantics exactly when V  ϕˇ(p) in
the usual Kripke-Joyal semantics. It then follows, by the usual characterization of
Kripke-Joyal semantics, that the standard representing subobject of ϕˇ also classifies
ϕ in the above sense. 
In particular, the usual internal logic of a positive Heyting category is exactly
the ∆0-fragment of the stack semantics. More precisely:
Corollary 7.7. A formula in the internal logic of S is valid if and only if its
translate under the correspondence of Lemma 3.15 is valid in the stack semantics.
If S is a Π-pretopos, then classifiers for all arrow-quantifiers can be constructed
from those for ∆0-quantifiers, since morphisms 1→ Y X are the same as morphisms
X → Y . Likewise, if S is a topos, we can classify quantifiers over subobjects.
However, there is no hope to classify arbitrary object-quantifiers in this way, and
in general not all sentences will be classified. This suggests the following definition.
Definition 7.8. A positive Heyting category is autological if all sentences over
all objects of S are classified.
In Theorem 7.22 we will show that S is autological precisely when its stack
semantics validates the structural axiom of separation from §4. But first, we need to
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investigate more generally how validity in the stack semantics relates to “external”
properties of S itself.
Like the ordinary internal logic which it generalizes, validity in the stack seman-
tics can be interpreted as “local” truth. In particular, for “statements which are
their own localizations,” validity in the stack semantics is equivalent to external
truth. Chief among “statements which are their own localizations” are assertions
of pullback-stable universal properties. More generally, by interpreting universal
properties in the stack semantics we transform them into their “localizations.” In
order to make this precise, we will reuse the notions of context and instantiation
from the (closely related) discussion of replacement axioms in §5.
Theorem 7.9. Let S be a positive Heyting category, let (Γ,∆) be a context in S
such that ∆ consists only of arrow-variables, and let ϕ(Γ) and ψ(Γ,∆) be formulas.
Then the following are equivalent.
(i) 1  pfor any ~A : Γ such that ϕ( ~A), there exists a unique ~f : ∆ extending ~A such
that ψ( ~A, ~f).q
(ii) For any U and any ~A : Γ in S/U such that U  ϕ( ~A), there exists a unique
~f : ∆ in S/U extending ~A such that U  ψ( ~A, ~f).
Proof. By the forcing interpretations of ∀ and ∃, statement (i) is equivalent to
saying that for any U and any ~A : Γ in S/U such that U  ϕ( ~A), there is a
regular epi V
p
−− U and an ~f : ∆ in S/V extending p∗ ~A such that V  ϕ(p∗ ~A, ~f),
and moreover for any W
q
−→ V and ~h : ∆ in S/W extending q∗p∗ ~A such that
W  ϕ(q∗p∗ ~A,~h), we have ~f = ~h.
In particular, ~f is unique in S/V such that V  ϕ(p∗ ~A, ~f), and therefore all the
arrows that make it up will satisfy the descent conditions over the kernel pair of p.
Since any Heyting category is a prestack for its coherent topology, ~f must descend
to an instantiation ~g of ∆ extending ~A over U , and descent of forcing implies that
U  ϕ( ~A, ~f); this proves (ii). The converse is easy. 
The following example will hopefully help clarify in what sense this theorem is
about pullback-stable universal properties.
Example 7.10. Let R
r //
s
// P
q
// Q be a diagram in S such that qr = qs. Let
Γ be the context (X, f : P → X), let ϕ(X, f) assert that fr = fs, let ∆ be the
context g : Q→ X extending Γ, and let ψ(X, f, g) assert that gq = f . (Note that R,
P , Q, r, s, and q are parameters of these contexts.) Then Theorem 7.9(i) becomes
1  pq is a coequalizer of r and sq, while (ii) becomes the assertion that q is a
pullback-stable coequalizer of r and s.
Generalizing from this example in the evident way, we can interpret Theorem 7.9
as saying that 1  p ~B has some universal propertyq if and only if U∗ ~B has the given
universal property in S/U for any U ∈ S. Similarly, for asserting the existence of
objects with universal properties, we have the following. Note that here we require
exactness, just as we did for Proposition 5.7.
Theorem 7.11. Let S be a Heyting pretopos, let (Γ,∆) be a context in S, and let
ϕ(Γ) and ψ(Γ,∆) be formulas. Then the following are equivalent.
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(i) 1  pfor any ~A : Γ such that ϕ( ~A), there exists a ~B : ∆ extending ~A such that
ψ( ~A, ~B), and any two such ~B are isomorphic by a unique isomorphism extending
1 ~A.q
(ii) For any U and any ~A : Γ in S/U such that U  ϕ( ~A), there exists a ~B : ∆ in
S/U extending ~A such that U  ψ( ~A, ~B), and any two such ~B are isomorphic
by a unique isomorphism extending 1 ~A.
Proof. Just like the proof of Theorem 7.9, but using the facts that any pretopos is
a stack for its coherent topology, and that uniqueness of isomorphisms implies that
they satisfy the cocycle condition. 
Following on from Example 7.10, we have the following.
Example 7.12. Let Γ be the context (R,P, r : R → P, s : R → P ), let ϕ = >, let
∆ be the context (Q, q : P → Q) extending Γ, and let ψ be the formula pq is a
coequalizer of r and sq considered in Example 7.10. Then Theorem 7.11(i) becomes
1  pevery parallel pair has a coequalizerq, while (ii) asserts that every slice category
of S has pullback-stable coequalizers (for which it suffices that S itself has them).
Thus, we can interpret Theorem 7.11 as saying that 1  pfor all ~A, there exists
~B with some universal propertyq if and only if for any U and any ~A in S/U , there
exists ~B in S/U such that p∗( ~A, ~B) has the specified universal property in S/V for
any p : V → U . In the future, we will apply these theorems to all sorts of universal
properties without further comment.
For statements ϕ that do not express simple universal properties, however, valid-
ity in the stack semantics (expressed by 1  ϕ) and external truth (expressed by
S  ϕ) can have quite different meanings. For example, if ϕ is pevery regular epi
splitsq, then S  ϕ iff S satisfies the external axiom of choice (AC), while 1  ϕ iff
S satisfies the internal axiom of choice (IAC). The most important example of the
divergence of  and , however, is the following.
Lemma 7.13. For any positive Heyting category S, we have 1  pS is constructively
well-pointed and satisfies collectionq.
Proof. We first show that 1  pS is constructively well-pointedq. If X
f
−→ U is in
S/U , m : A  X is monic, and U  pevery 1
x
−→ X factors through Aq, then in
particular the generic element ∆X : X → f
∗X in S/X factors through m; hence
m is split epic and thus an isomorphism. Thus 1  p1 is a strong generatorq. Now
since the initial object is strict, the existence of a map 1→ 0 is the same as saying
that 1 is an initial object. Then if U  p1U is initialq, U must be initial; hence
1  p1 is not initialq. Similarly, if U  pV → 1U is regular epicq, then V → U is in
fact regular epic, and thus (since V has a section over itself) U  (∃v : 1 → V )>.
Finally, if U  pU = V ∪Wq, then U = V ∪W , and so since V andW have sections
over themselves, we have U  (∃v : 1→ V )> ∨ (∃w : 1→W )>.
We now show 1  pS satisfies collectionq. Suppose that 1  (∀u ∈ U)(∃X)ϕ(u,X).
Then U  (∃X)ϕ(∆U , X), so we have a regular epi V
p
−− U and an A ∈ S/V with
V  ϕ(p,A). Thus, for any W and any W
v
−→ V , we have W  ϕ(pv, v∗A), which
is the desired conclusion. Collection of functions is analogous. 
This validates our assertion that the stack semantics of any Heyting pretopos
models a structural set theory. Therefore, from now on we avail ourselves of
Convention 3.14 when speaking in the stack semantics.
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Remark 7.14. Under the second approach to stack semantics, Lemma 7.13 says that
if S is small, any strictification of its self-indexing is well-pointed and satisfies collec-
tion as an internal category in the topos Sh(S) of sheaves for the coherent topology
of S. Since Sh(S) is a coherent topos, it has enough points, so this is equivalent to
saying that each stalk has these properties. This version of Lemma 7.13 was proven
in [Awo97], and we will prove the analogous fact for the 2-category of stacks on S
in [Shua]; see also §10.
Remark 7.15. Theorem 7.11 implies that 1  pthe self-indexing of S is a stackq is
true in any Heyting pretopos. Thus, by Propositions 5.2 and 5.7, replacement of
contexts is also always valid in the stack semantics of a Heyting pretopos.
Moreover, any additional axiom of structural set theory that is expressible as
a pullback-stable universal property will be faithfully represented in the stack se-
mantics. This includes all the structure mentioned in Theorem 3.5, except for AC
and full classical logic. In particular, we can say:
• If S is a Π-pretopos with a nno satisfying the “internal presentation axiom”
(there are enough internal projectives), then its stack semantics models CETCS.
• If S is any topos with a nno, then its stack semantics models IETCS.
Of course, Lemma 7.13 also says that the stack semantics of a Heyting pretopos
is not just any structural set theory, but also satisfies collection. In particular,
from any constructively well-pointed Heyting pretopos, we can construct another
one which satisfies collection—albeit in an exotic logic (namely, the stack semantics
of the original category). This implies the well-known fact that intuitionistically,
the addition of collection does not change the consistency strength of a theory.
Remark 7.16. Since by Proposition 5.4, adding collection to full classical logic does
change the consistency strength, it follows that full classical logic is not in general
preserved by passage to the stack semantics. It is not hard to show that if the stack
semantics of S satisfies full classical logic, then S is necessarily autological.
In fact, well-pointedness and collection are “precisely” the characteristic prop-
erties of the stack semantics, in the following sense.
Theorem 7.17. Let S be a positive Heyting category; the following are equivalent.
(i) S is constructively well-pointed and satisfies collection.
(ii) For any U ∈ S and any sentence ϕ over U , we have U  ϕ if and only if
S  u∗ϕ for all 1
u
−→ U .
Proof. First assume (ii). In particular, this means that for any sentence ϕ in S we
have 1  ϕ if and only if S  ϕ. Since the stack semantics is always constructively
well-pointed and satisfies collection, it follows from (ii) that S is so, proving (i).
Now assume (i); we prove (ii) by structural induction on ϕ. For an atomic for-
mula (f = g) where f, g : X → Y in S/U , we can verify that (f = g) is equivalent to
(∀x ∈ X)(fx = gx), which is a ∆0-formula and hence classified by Proposition 7.6.
Thus, strong-generation of 1 implies the result for atomic formulas.
The cases of > and ∧ are obvious, as usual. If U  ⊥, then U is initial, and thus
(since 1 is nonempty) it has no global elements 1 → U ; thus S  ⊥ for every such
global element. Conversely, if U has no global elements, then the map 0 → U is a
bijection on global elements, hence an isomorphism since 1 is a strong generator.
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If U  (ϕ∨ψ), then U = V ∪W with V  ϕ and W  ψ; hence by the inductive
hypotheses, S  v∗ϕ for all 1
v
−→ V and S  w∗ψ for all 1
w
−→ W . But since
1 is indecomposable, every 1
u
−→ U factors through either V or W , hence either
S  u∗ϕ or S  u∗ψ, so S  u∗(ϕ ∨ ψ). Conversely, suppose S  u∗(ϕ ∨ ψ) for
each 1
u
−→ U , and consider the objects U and U + U over U , which pull back to
1 and 1 + 1 along any 1
u
−→ U . Applying collection of functions to the statement
peither u∗ϕ and 1
f
−→ 1 + 1 is the first injection, or u∗ψ and 1
f
−→ 1 + 1 is the
second injectionq, we obtain a regular epimorphism V
p
−− U and a suitable map
V → V + V over V . This map decomposes V as a coproduct W +X , and by the
inductive hypothesis we have W  p∗ϕ and X  p∗ψ; hence U  (ϕ ∨ ψ).
If U  (ϕ ⇒ ψ), then for any 1
u
−→ U , if S  u∗ϕ, then by the inductive
hypothesis 1  u∗ϕ and so 1  u∗ψ, hence S  u∗ψ by the inductive hypothesis.
Thus S  u∗(ϕ ⇒ ψ). Conversely, if S  u∗(ϕ ⇒ ψ) for all 1
u
−→ U , then for
any V
p
−→ U with V  p∗ϕ, for any 1
v
−→ V we have 1  (pv)∗ϕ, hence (by the
inductive hypothesis) S  (pv)∗ϕ, so S  (pv)∗ψ, and thus 1  (pv)∗ψ. By the
inductive hypothesis, we have V  p∗ψ; hence U  (ϕ⇒ ψ).
If U  (∃X)ϕ(X), then we have a regular epimorphism V
p
−− U and an A ∈ S/V
with V  ϕ(A). But for any 1
u
−→ U , by projectivity of 1 there is a 1
v
−→ V with
pv = u, and 1  v∗p∗ϕ(v∗A), hence S  (pv)∗ϕ(v∗A), and thus S  (∃X)(pv)∗ϕ(X).
Conversely, if S  (∃X)u∗ϕ(X) for each 1
u
−→ U , then by collection of sets, there
exists a regular epimorphism V
p
−− U and an A ∈ S/V such that S  (pv)∗ϕ(v∗A)
for all 1
v
−→ V , whence V  p∗ϕ(A) by the inductive hypothesis, and so U 
(∃X)ϕ(X). Existential quantification of morphisms is analogous.
Finally, if U  (∀X)ϕ(X), then for any 1
u
−→ U and A ∈ S we have 1 
u∗ϕ(A), hence S  u∗ϕ(A) by the inductive hypothesis, and so S  (∀X)u∗ϕ(X).
Conversely, if S  (∀X)u∗ϕ(X) for all 1
u
−→ U , then for any V
p
−→ U and B ∈ S/V ,
we have S  (pv)∗ϕ(v∗B) for any 1
v
−→ V , hence V  p∗ϕ(B) by the inductive
hypothesis; hence U  (∀X)ϕ(X). 
Corollary 7.18. The theory of a constructively well-pointed Heyting pretopos sat-
isfying collection is complete for stack semantics over Heyting pretoposes. More
precisely, if a statement is valid in the stack semantics of any Heyting pretopos (in
any intuitionistic metatheory), then it can be proved from the axioms of a construc-
tively well-pointed Heyting pretopos satisfying collection.
Proof. By standard completeness theorems for intuitionistic logic, it suffices to show
that if 1 S ϕ for any Heyting pretopos S (in any intuitionistic metatheory), then
Set  ϕ for any constructively well-pointed Heyting pretopos Set that satisfies
collection. However, for any such Set, Theorem 7.17 implies that Set  ϕ if and
only if 1 Set ϕ, and the latter is true by assumption. 
We now turn to our promised characterization of the axiom of separation in the
stack semantics. First we need to know that the stack semantics is “local” and
“idempotent”.
Lemma 7.19. For any V
p
−→ U and any sentence ϕ over V in S, we have V S ϕ
if and only if (V
p
−→ U) S/U ϕ.
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Proof. Straightforward from the definition, since unions and regular epis in S/U
are created in S. 
Lemma 7.20. For any sentence ϕ over V and any V
p
−→ U , we have U  pV  ϕq
if and only if V  ϕ.
Proof. By Lemma 7.19, it suffices to assume that U = 1. And since the stack
semantics of S satisfies collection, by Theorem 7.17 we have
(7.21) 1  pV  ϕ if and only if v∗ϕ holds for all 1
v
−→ V q
In the “only if” direction, (7.21) says that if W is such that for any Z
q
−→ W and
Z
v
−→ V we have Z  v∗ϕ, then W W ∗(pV  ϕq), i.e. W  pW ∗V  W ∗ϕq. In
particular, for W = 1, this says that if for any Z
v
−→ V we have Z  v∗ϕ, then 1 
pV  ϕq. But this hypothesis is satisfied as soon as V  ϕ, so V  ϕ implies 1 
pV  ϕq.
In the “if” direction, (7.21) says that for any W
v
−→ V , if W  pW ∗V W ∗ϕq,
then W  v∗ϕ. In particular, for W = V and v = 1V , it says that if V 
pV ∗V  V ∗ϕq, then V  ϕ. But if 1  pV  ϕq, then also V  pV ∗V  V ∗ϕq by
pullback, so 1  pV  ϕq implies V  ϕ as desired. 
Recall that we define S to be autological if all sentences over all objects of S are
classified in the sense of Definition 7.5.
Theorem 7.22. Let S be a Heyting pretopos; the following are equivalent.
(i) S is autological.
(ii) 1  pS is autologicalq
(iii) 1  pS satisfies the axiom of separationq.
(iv) (If S is constructively well-pointed) S satisfies separation and collection.
Proof. Lemma 7.20 implies that autology is a pullback-stable universal property,
so Theorem 7.11 implies that (i)⇔(ii). And by Theorem 7.17, the stack seman-
tics is always constructively well-pointed and satisfies collection, so if we show
that (i)⇔(iv), then internalizing the same argument will show (ii)⇔(iii).
Suppose S is constructively well-pointed and autological; we show it satisfies
Theorem 7.17(ii). Note that the inductive proof of 7.17(i)⇒(ii) only used collection
in two cases, ∨ and ∃, and only in the () ⇒ () direction. Thus it will suffice to
prove 7.17(ii) for formulas of the form (ϕ ∨ ψ), (∃X)ϕ(X), or (∃f : X → Y )ϕ(f),
in each case assuming inductively that 7.17(ii) holds for the constituent formulas.
Note first that all of these statements are obvious if U = 1. In the case of ∨, if
S  (ϕ ∨ ψ), then S  ϕ or S  ψ, whence by induction 1  ϕ or 1  ψ, and thus
1  (ϕ ∨ ψ) via one of the decompositions 1 = 1 ∪ 0 or 1 = 0 ∪ 1. Similarly, in the
second case, if S  (∃X)ϕ(X), then there is some A ∈ S with S  ϕ(A), whence
by induction 1  ϕ(A), and so 1  (∃X)ϕ(X) via the cover 1 1. Quantification
over arrows is identical.
Now if χ is one of the formulas in question over a general U , by autology we
can form JχK  U . By hypothesis, for any 1
u
−→ U we have S  u∗χ, so the
above remark shows that 1  u∗χ, whence u factors through JχK. But 1 is a strong
generator, so JχK is all of U and thus U  χ, as desired.
Thus, by Theorem 7.17, S satisfies collection, so it remains to prove separation.
Suppose given U and ϕ(u), and let ψ ≡ U∗ϕ(∆U ). Then ψ is a sentence over U
such that u∗ψ is equivalent to ϕ(u) for any 1
u
−→ U . Now consider JψK. Then for
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any 1
u
−→ U , by Theorem 7.17, S  ϕ(u) is equivalent to 1  ϕ(u), and thus to
1  u∗ψ, which is true iff u factors through JψK; thus JψK satisfies the conclusion of
the separation axiom. Thus we have (i)⇒(iv).
Now assume S is well-pointed and satisfies separation and collection. For any
sentence ϕ over U , we apply separation to find a subobject S  U such that
1
u
−→ U factors through S if and only if S  u∗ϕ. By Theorem 7.17, S  ϕ. And if
V
p
−→ U is such that V  p∗ϕ, then for any 1
v
−→ V , pv factors through S, which
(since S is well-pointed) implies that V factors through S. Thus, S = JϕK, so S is
autological. 
In particular, the implication (iv)⇒(i) of Theorem 7.22 shows that if V satisfies
IZF, then Set(V) is autological, giving us our first examples of autological topoi.
We now present a quick proof that any complete topos over IZF (including any
Grothendieck topos) is autological.
Fix a model V of IZF. As usual in material set theory, by a large category we
mean a category whose objects and arrows form proper classes in the sense of V,
i.e. consist of the sets in V satisfying some first-order formulas. Recall that a topos
is well-powered if and only if it is locally small, and that if it is complete it is also
cocomplete. Note that any cocomplete topos also has a nno, namely the countable
copower of 1. The examples of most interest are of course Grothendieck toposes,
i.e. categories of sheaves on a small site.
Lemma 7.23. If S is a complete and well-powered topos over a model of IZF and
U =
⋃
i∈I Vi in S with Vi  ϕ for all i ∈ I, then U  ϕ.
Proof. This is, of course, an extension of Lemma 7.3(v) to the infinitary case, but
the proof requires the use of collection in V. The cases of atomic formulas, >, ⊥,
and ∧ are again easy, while ∨ follows from distributivity of unions over themselves,
and ⇒ and ∀ follow from pullback-stability of unions.
For ∃, if we have Vi  (∃X)ϕ(X) for all i ∈ I, then for each i there is an
epimorphism W  V and an A ∈ S/W such that W  ϕ(A). By collection in
V, we have a set Q such that for every i ∈ I there is a quadruple (i,W, p,A) ∈ Q
such that p : W  Vi is an epimorphism, A ∈ S/W , and W  ϕ(A). Let B =∐
(i,W,p,A)∈QA and Z =
∐
(i,W,p,A)∈QW , which exist since S is cocomplete. We
then have an induced epimorphism q : Z  U , and since Z =
⋃
(i,W,p,A)∈QW and
B pulls back over each W to the corresponding A, the inductive hypothesis implies
that Z  ϕ(B). Therefore, U  (∃X)ϕ(X). Existential quantification over arrows
is analogous. 
Theorem 7.24. Any complete and well-powered topos over a model of IZF is auto-
logical.
Proof. Let S be such a topos and ϕ a sentence over U in S. Using separation in
V and well-poweredness of S, let K be a set of subobjects of U representing each
isomorphism class V  U such that V  ϕ. Since S is complete, K has a union;
call it S. By Lemma 7.23, S  ϕ. And given any W
p
−→ U such that W  ϕ, if R
is the image of p, then R  ϕ, so R ∼= V for some V ∈ K; hence R ⊆ S and thus p
factors through S. Thus, S classifies ϕ, so S is autological. 
Remark 7.25. This implies that in a Grothendieck topos of sheaves on some site,
the definition of the stack semantics can be rephrased in terms of a forcing relation
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defined only over the site, just as for the usual internal logic. We omit the proof,
which is very much like those of Theorems 7.17 and 10.8.
We will see another way of proving autology in §10: the category of small ob-
jects in any category of classes which satisfies separation is autological. In [Shub]
we will prove directly that autology is preserved by many other topos-theoretic
constructions.
Remark 7.26. We have not mentioned the interpretation of fullness, induction, or
well-founded induction in the stack semantics. Since these do not express simple
universal properties, their stack-semantics versions are not generally equivalent to
their “external” versions. One can, of course, write out explicitly in terms of S
what each of these axioms means in the stack semantics, and the result will be the
appropriate version of that axiom for a non-well-pointed category. For example,
the assertion that 1  pS satisfies fullnessq is equivalent to the categorical version
of fullness given in [vdBDM07, vdBM07] (minus their ‘smallness’ conditions).
8. Material set theories in the stack semantics
We can now combine §§6 and 7 in the expected way: from any Heyting pretopos
S, we obtain an interpretation of material set theory by interpreting the theory of
§6 in the stack semantics of S. In particular, we can construct interpretations of
material set theory by starting with a model V, passing to the category Set(V),
performing some category-theoretic construction on Set(V) (which generally de-
stroys well-pointedness), then constructing the model of §6 in the stack semantics
of the resulting category.
There are several important questions to ask about this construction. The first
is, which of the relevant category-theoretic properties of Set(V) are preserved by
the constructions in question, and which others can be “forced” to hold or fail by
a clever choice of such a construction? To study this in generality is not our aim
in this paper, but we remark briefly on what is known.
(i) The most-studied case is that of elementary topoi, which are well-known to be
preserved by all sorts of constructions, such as sheaves (on internal sites), coal-
gebras for left-exact comonads, Artin gluing, realizability, and filterquotients.
Natural numbers objects are also usually preserved.
(ii) Realizability and sheaf constructions on Π-pretoposes (often also satisfying
some additional axioms, such as fullness) are studied in [MP00, MP02, vdB05a,
AGLW09, vdB05b, vdBM07, vdBM08, vdBM09], among other places (see
also [AST]).
(iii) Of course, Booleanness and the axiom of choice are not usually preserved by
any of these constructions.
(iv) On the other hand, we have seen that collection is always satisfied in the stack
semantics.
(v) We will prove in [Shub] that the axiom of separation, in its stack-semantics
form (i.e. autology as defined in §7) is also preserved by the constructions of
sheaves, coalgebras, gluing, realizability, and filterquotients.
(vi) We are not aware of any results regarding the preservation of full induction
or well-founded induction.
The second important question to ask is, how does this approach compare to
existing category-theoretic constructions of interpretations of material set theory?
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As mentioned in the introduction, such interpretations fall into two groups: the
older approach of Fourman [Fou80] and Hayashi [Hay81], and the newer approach
of algebraic set theory begun by Joyal and Moerdijk [JM95]. The next two sections
are devoted to comparing our models with these; under general hypotheses they
turn out to be equivalent.
The third important question to ask is, how does this approach compare with
well-known constructions of models that remain entirely within the world of mate-
rial set theory? We will not study this question here, but a partial answer to it can
be extracted from our answers to the second question.
For instance, in [BS89, BS92] it is shown, using a construction of Freyd [Fre87],
that the Fourman-Hayashi interpretation in any Boolean Grothendieck topos (de-
fined over a model of ZFC) can be identified with a certain symmetric submodel of a
Boolean-valued model of ZF. (Fourman [Fou80] already observed this in particular
cases.) It then follows that the stack-semantics model in any such Grothendieck
topos can also be so identified. Hayashi [Hay81] also asserted that his interpretation
in a topos of sheaves on a complete Heyting algebra agrees with the corresponding
Heyting-valued model of IZF, as in [Gra79]. Since Freyd’s construction also applies
to non-Boolean topoi, it seems likely that the Fourman-Hayashi interpretation in an
arbitrary Grothendieck topos can similarly be compared to symmetric submodels
of Heyting-valued models as studied in [TT81], but to my knowledge this has not
been written down. Likewise, in [KGvO05, vdBM08] it is shown that the model of
material set theory constructed via algebraic set theory from a realizability topos
agrees with McCarty’s realizability model of IZF [Mcc84], and thus so does the
stack-semantics model in a realizability topos. In principle, it should be possible to
give a direct comparison between stack-semantics models and material-set-theoretic
models, but we will not do so here.
9. The cumulative hierarchy in a complete topos
In this section we will show that in good cases, our interpretation of material set
theory in the stack semantics is equivalent to the interpretations of Fourman [Fou80]
and Hayashi [Hay81]. In fact, Hayashi defines his interpretation by way of a Kripke-
Joyal semantics, which is thus quite evidently the same as the stack-semantics ap-
proach. Fourman uses instead representing subobjects, which he can only construct
in a complete and well-powered topos. Additionally, both focus on a version of the
“von Neumann hierarchy” constructed internally to the topos, which our approach
shows to be unnecessary.
Let us begin by reformulating the stack-semantics interpretation of material set
theory in terms of elements rather than slice categories. Let S be a topos with
a nno, let A be a well-founded extensional graph in S, and let x : U → A be a
morphism. Let x denote the subobject of U∗A such that in the internal logic of
S/U , x contains precisely those y ∈ A which admit a path to x.
Lemma 9.1. Let x and x be as above, and similarly y : U → A and y.
(i) U  px is a well-founded extensional apgq.
(ii) U  (x ∼= y) if and only if x = y.
(iii) U  (x  y) if and only if x ≺ y.
(iv) If f : A ↪→ B is a simulation, then U  (x ∼= fx).
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Furthermore, every well-founded extensional apg in S/U is isomorphic to one of
the form x, for some well-founded extensional graph A in S and some x : U → A.
Proof. Since U∗ : S → S/U is a logical functor, and well-foundedness and exten-
sionality are ∆0-properties in a topos, U  pU
∗A is a well-founded extensional
graphq. The proof of (i) is then obvious by arguing internally, while (iv) follows
from Lemma 6.18. The “if” directions of (ii) and (iii) are easy, while the “only if”
directions can be shown by well-founded induction.
Finally, suppose X is a well-founded extensional apg in S/U . Arguing in the
stack semantics of S, consider X as a graph in S itself and form X + 1, with ≺
inherited from X and with ?u ≺ ?, where for each u ∈ U , ?u denotes the root of the
fiber u∗X . Then X + 1 satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 6.24 with n = 1; let A
be its extensional quotient. The section U → X (which equips X with its root, as
an apg in S/U) induces a map x : U → A and it is easy to verify that X ∼= x. 
Remark 9.2. Since isomorphisms between well-founded extensional graphs are unique
when they exist, U  (x ∼= y) if and only if in fact x ∼= y in S/U , and similarly
U  (x  y) if and only if there exists a z : U → y such that x ∼= y/z in S/U .
Remark 9.3. Combining Lemma 9.1(ii) with (iv), we see that for x : U → A and
y : U → B, we have x ∼= y iff fx = gy for some (hence any) well-founded extensional
graph C with simulations f : A→ C and g : B → C, and similarly for membership.
Note that for any any such pair A,B there exists such a C with f and g, such as
the extensional quotient of A+B + 1.
Theorem 9.4. The stack semantics interpretation of material set theory in a topos
can equivalently be described as follows. Instead of well-founded extensional apgs
in S/U , the parameters at stage U are morphisms x : U → A, where A is any well-
founded extensional graph in S. The forcing semantics of formulas ϕ is defined
inductively by:
• For x : U → A and y : U → B, we say U  (x = y) if fx = gy for some (hence
any) simulations f : A→ C and g : B → C.
• Likewise, U  (x ∈ y) if fx ≺ gy for f and g as above.
• The connectives are interpreted in the usual Kripke-Joyal way.
• We say U  (∃x)ϕ(x) if there is an epimorphism V  U and an x : V → A, for
some well-founded extensional graph A, such that V  ϕ(x).
• Likewise, U  (∀x)ϕ(x) if V  ϕ(x) for any V → U , any well-founded exten-
sional graph A, and any map x : V → A.
Proof. Straightforward induction on formulas, using Lemma 9.1. 
This is exactly the interpretation of Hayashi [Hay81], except that he considers
only morphisms x : U → A where A belongs to some specified class U of well-
founded extensional graphs. Of course, some closure conditions on U are then
necessary to ensure that the axioms of material set theory are satisfied. Hayashi
assumes that:
• For any A,B ∈ U there is a C ∈ U with simulations A ↪→ C and B ↪→ C, and
• For any A ∈ U there is a B ∈ U with a simulation PA ↪→ B.
Here PA is the power-object of A, equipped with the well-founded extensional
relation ≺ defined internally as follows: for subsets H,K ⊆ A, we have H ≺ K
iff there exists x ∈ K such that H = { y | y ≺ x }. Hayashi calls a U satisfying
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these conditions a pre-universe, and proves that the above semantics valued in
any pre-universe validates the core axioms together with power sets, foundation,
and transitive closures, plus infinity if there is a nno, and ∆0-classical logic if the
topos is Boolean. We thus record:
Theorem 9.5. Let S be a topos and let U be the maximal pre-universe consisting of
all well-founded extensional graphs. Then the interpretation of material set theory
in the stack semantics of S is identical to Hayashi’s interpretation valued in U . 
Hayashi also defines a universe to be a pre-universe such that
• For any (small) set S ⊆ U , there is a B ∈ U such that for all A ∈ S there exists
a simulation A→ B.
Of course, this is no longer an elementary property; it only makes sense when work-
ing in some ambient set theory. Note that the class of all well-founded extensional
graphs need not, in general, be a universe. It is a universe, however, if S is co-
complete relative to the external set theory, since then B can be obtained as the
extensional quotient of
∐
A∈S A+ 1.
Hayashi proves that the axiom of collection is satisfied if S is well-powered and
U is a universe. Our approach via the stack semantics shows that in fact, these
hypotheses are unnecessary: the axiom of collection is always satisfied, at least for
the maximal pre-universe. Hayashi also claims that the axiom of separation is valid
as soon as the subobject lattices of S are complete Heyting algebras, even if U is
only a pre-universe, but I don’t think this can be correct, since it would imply the
relative consistency of collection assuming separation.
The one remaining difference between Hayashi’s approach and ours is that rather
than the “maximal” pre-universe consisting of all well-founded extensional graphs,
he is more interested in the “minimal” ones obtained by transfinitely iterating the
power set operation, mimicking the construction of the von Neumann hierarchy in
material set theory. This is also the approach taken by Fourman.
In order to make sense of this transfinite iteration, we of course need an ex-
ternal set theory containing ordinals along which we can perform induction. For
convenience and familiarity, we take this to be a material set theory. Thus, for
the rest of this section, let V be a model of IZF, with Set = Set(V) its category
of sets. (Fourman and Hayashi assumed the metatheory to be ZFC, but this is
unnecessary.)
Let S be a complete and well-powered topos over V. We will describe the
cumulative hierarchy in S, as constructed by Fourman and Hayashi. Recall that a
(von Neumann) ordinal in V is a transitive set on which ∈ is a transitive relation
(it is automatically well-founded, by the axiom of foundation). Since set-induction
is valid in IZF, we can construct objects of S by transfinite recursion on ordinals.
Thus we can inductively define a well-founded extensional graph Vα for each ordinal
α of V such that Vα is the extensional quotient of
∐
β<α PVβ . (The well-founded
relation on PVβ is defined as above, by setting H ≺ K if there exists an x ∈ K
such that H = { y | y ≺ x }.)
Remark 9.6. Fourman and Hayashi defined the hierarchy Vα in a more traditional
way, by conditioning on whether α is zero, a successor, or a limit:
V0 = 0 Vα+1 = PVα Vα = colimβ<α Vβ (α a limit)
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Intuitionistically, this classification of ordinals is no longer valid. We could still try
to define Vα = colimβ<α PVβ , but since intuitionistic ordinals are not necessarily
linearly ordered, in general this colimit need not be extensional. However, in the
classical case, all three definitions are equivalent.
Evidently, the class {Vα} is a universe in S, in Hayashi’s sense. Thus, it induces
a class of well-founded extensional apgs in all slices of S, namely those of the form
x for some x : U → Vα. It is natural to ask whether this includes all well-founded
extensional apgs, and thus whether Hayashi’s interpretation valued in U = {Vα}
is the same as the stack-semantics interpretation. The answer is yes.
Lemma 9.7. In any complete and well-powered topos S, every (internally) well-
founded extensional apg in S/U is of the form x for some ordinal α and some
x : U → Vα.
Proof. Since every slice topos of a complete and well-powered topos is also such,
and pullback functors U∗ preserve the construction of the Vα hierarchy, we may
assume that U = 1. Thus, let X be a well-founded extensional apg in S; the proof
is a modified version of the standard recursion theorem for well-founded relations.
For a fixed ordinal α, define an α-attempt to be a partial function X ⇀ Vα which
is a simulation and whose domain is an initial segment of X . Using extensionality
of Vα, we can prove by induction on X in the internal logic of S that any two
α-attempts agree on their common domain, and that the union of any family of α-
attempts is an α-attempt. Therefore, there is a unique largest α-attempt fα : X ⇀
Vα. Furthermore, for any β ≥ α there is a unique simulation iβα : Vα ↪→ Vβ , and we
must have iβαfα = fβ .
We now show that there exists an α such that fα is defined on all of X . Consider
the set D of subobjects S  X such that S is the domain of fα for some α; this
exists since S is well-powered and V satisfies separation. By collection in V, there
is a set A of ordinals such that for any S ∈ D, S = dom(fα) for some α ∈ A.
Let β =
⋃
α∈A α and γ = β
+; we claim that fγ is a total function. Let Sγ be its
domain. First, note that by the construction of A, there exists an α ∈ A such that
Sγ is the domain of fα. Since the domains of fα are increasing in α, it follows that
Sγ is the domain of fβ as well.
We will prove that Sγ is an inductive subset of X , and hence must be all of X .
Applying the Kripke-Joyal semantics, suppose given some U and some q : U → X
such that for any p : U ′ → U and any q′ : U ′ → X such that q′ ≺ qp, q′ factors
through Sγ ; we must show that q factors through Sγ .
Let T ⊆ U∗X be the subset defined in the internal logic by { x ∈ X | x ≺ q }.
Then by assumption, T factors through U∗Sγ and therefore the domain of U
∗fβ
contains T . Then T is classified by a map t : U → PX . Now the partial function
fβ determines a map Pfβ : PX → PVβ by taking images, so by composition we
have a map Pfβ ◦ t : U → PVβ . But PVβ ∼= Vγ , so we have a map r : U → Vγ .
Let U ⊆ X be the image of q : U → X . We can prove in the internal logic that if
q(u) = q(u′) for some u, u′ ∈ U , then r(u) = r(u′); hence r descends to r : U → Vγ .
We can also show, again internally, that if x ∈ Sγ and x = q(u), then r(x) = fγ(x),
since both are equal to { fβ(y) | y ≺ x }. Therefore, if we let S = Sγ ∪ U , then fγ
and r induce a map g : S → Vγ . Finally, we can show that g is a simulation, hence
its domain is a subset of Sγ ; thus U ⊆ Sγ , i.e. q factors through Sγ . Hence Sγ is
inductive, and thus all of X , so fγ is a total function. 
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Therefore, we have:
Theorem 9.8. Let S be a complete and well-powered topos, and let U be the above
von Neumann universe in S. Then the interpretation of material set theory in the
stack semantics of S is identical to Hayashi’s interpretation valued in U . 
Finally, we relate this to Fourman’s approach [Fou80]. Instead of a forcing
semantics, he works with representing subobjects. Thus, we still consider the pa-
rameters to be morphisms x : U → A for some well-founded extensional graph A in
a pre-universe U , but now instead of a forcing relation we define, for each formula
ϕ at stage U , a subobject JϕK U , as follows.
• If x : U → A and y : U → B, then Jx = yK is the equalizer of fx and gy where
f : A→ C and g : B → C are a pair of simulations.
• Similarly, Jx ∈ yK is the pullback of C≺ along (fx, gy).
• The connectives ⊥, >, ∧, ∨, ⇒, and ¬ are interpreted using the Heyting algebra
connectives in Sub(U), as usual.
• Given a formula ϕ(x) at stage U with one free variable x, for each well-founded
extensional graph A consider the image of
Jϕ(pi2)K U ×A
pi1−→ U.
This is a subobject of U , call it J(∃x ∈ A)ϕ(x)K. Since S is well-powered, we can
apply separation in V to obtain the set of all subobjects of U which are of the
form J(∃x ∈ A)ϕ(x)K for some A ∈ U . Since S is cocomplete, we can then take
the union of this set; call it J(∃x)ϕ(x)K.
• Universal quantification is similar, using the dual image ∀pi1Jϕ(pi2)K instead of
the image ∃pi1Jϕ(pi2)K, and an intersection instead of a union.
These subobjects are essentially the same as those defined by Fourman, although
he also considered only the von Neumann universe. Thus it remains only to check
that they do, in fact, represent the forcing relation defined by Hayashi.
Lemma 9.9. Let S be a complete and well-powered topos and U a pre-universe.
Then for any formula ϕ at stage U and any map W
p
−→ U , we have W  ϕ in
Hayashi’s sense if and only if p factors through JϕK in Fourman’s sense.
Proof. Since S is autological by Theorem 7.24, the forcing relation of Hayashi is rep-
resentable. Thus, it remains only to check that the subobjects defined by Fourman
are the same as those produced by autology. This is evident for atomic formulas
and connectives, so we consider only the quantifiers.
In Fourman’s construction of J(∃x)ϕ(x)K, it is clear that J(∃x ∈ A)ϕ(x)K 
(∃x)ϕ(x) for each A, so by Lemma 7.23 we also have J(∃x)ϕ(x)K  (∃x)ϕ(x). On
the other hand, given W → U such that W  (∃x)ϕ(x), we have an epimorphism
Z  W and a map x : Z → A, for some A ∈ U , such that Z  ϕ(x). Thus,
Z → U × A factors through Jϕ(pi2)K, so W → U factors through J(∃x ∈ A)ϕ(x)K,
and hence also through J(∃x)ϕ(x)K. Thus, Fourman’s subobject J(∃x)ϕ(x)K is in
fact a representing object for (∃x)ϕ(x).
Universal quantification is even easier. If W  (∀x)ϕ(x), then for any A ∈ U ,
p : W → U must factor through J(∀x ∈ A)ϕ(x)K, whence it factors through their
intersection J(∀x)ϕ(x)K. Conversely, it suffices to show that J(∀x)ϕ(x)K  (∀x)ϕ(x),
but this follows since by definition, we have J(∀x)ϕ(x)K  (∀x ∈ A)ϕ(x) for any
A ∈ U . 
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Theorem 9.10. Let S be a complete and well-powered topos, and let U be the
above von Neumann universe. Then the interpretation of material set theory in the
stack semantics of S is identical to Fourman’s interpretation valued in U . 
As remarked previously, it follows from known facts about the Fourman-Hayashi
interpretation that the stack-semantics interpretation in Grothendieck toposes, such
as sheaves on a locale or continuous group actions, can also be identified with
the logic of standard material-set-theoretic constructions, such as Boolean- and
Heyting-valued, permutation, and symmetric models. See [Fou80, BS89, BS92].
10. Categories of classes
We now turn to a comparison between the stack semantics and the methods of
algebraic set theory, a field which was begun by [JM95] and has been carried forward
by many others; see [AST] for a number of references. The idea of algebraic set
theory is to consider, rather than a category whose objects represent sets, a larger
category whose objects represent classes, equipped with a “notion of smallness”
specifying which objects (and more generally which families) should be regarded
as sets. In particular, we require that there is a “class of all sets.” We can then
interpret “unbounded” quantifiers over all sets as bounded quantifiers in the internal
logic of the category of classes.
There is not yet a universally accepted set of axioms for a category of classes, so
we will at first restrict ourselves to a small core set of axioms.
Definition 10.1. A (representable) notion of smallness on a positive Heyting
category C consists of a distinguished map E
pi
−→ S. Given pi, a morphism X → U
in C is called small if there exist two pullback squares
X

X ′oo //


_ _

E
pi

U U ′p
oooo
θX
// S.
in which U ′  U is a regular epimorphism. An object X is called small if X → 1
is a small map.
Observe that a morphism X → U is small if and only if U  pthere exists an
x ∈ S such that X ∼= x∗Eq in the stack semantics of C. We thus abbreviate this
statement as pX is smallq. Note also that a map f : X → Y in C/U is small if and
only if U  pfor every y ∈ Y , the fiber y∗X is smallq, which is precisely the intended
intuition. Thus we abbreviate this statement as pf is smallq. The possibility of this
sensible “logical” interpretation depends, of course, on allowing passage to a cover
in the definition of small maps, since we cannot expect classifying maps of small
objects to be uniquely defined.
In the literature, it is more common to consider C as equipped with a class of
maps called “small” and then assert the existence of a representing map pi as an
axiom. As observed in [MP02], however, defining the small maps from pi as above
has the advantage that it immediately implies a few of the other common axioms
for small maps, including:
• Small maps are closed under pullback.
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• Small maps descend along regular epis, i.e. if the pullback of f : X → U along a
regular epi V  U is small, so is f .
• If X → U and Y → V are small maps, then so is X + Y → U + V .
Let S be the full subcategory of C determined by the small objects; we intend
to define a translation from the stack semantics of S to the internal logic of C.
However, for S to have a well-behaved stack semantics, it must be itself a positive
Heyting category. The following definition is closely related to those commonly
assumed in the literature, but weaker (and thus more general) than most.
Definition 10.2. A category of classes is a positive Heyting category equipped
with a notion of smallness which additionally satisfies the following axioms.
(i) 1 C pif X is small, then a map f : Y → X is small if and only if Y is smallq.
(ii) 1 C pthe full subcategory of small objects is closed under finite limits, finite
coproducts, images, and dual images (and is therefore itself a positive Heyting
category)q.
(iii) Every small map is exponentiable.
We have stated the first two conditions in terms of the stack semantics, since we
believe it makes their real meaning clearer. Of course, if we work out what they
mean explicitly in terms of C, we see that they reduce to some well-known axioms
for categories of classes. Specifically, the first is equivalent to:
• if g is small, then gf is small if and only if f is small.
Assuming this (and the representable definition of small maps as above), the second
is equivalent to:
• For any U , the full subcategory of C/U determined by the small maps is a
positive Heyting category, and the inclusion functor preserves all the structure.
More explicitly, this is equivalent to the following axioms.
• All isomorphisms are small.
• 0 and 1 + 1 are small objects.
• If g : B → C and gf : A→ C are small, then so is the composite im(f) B →
C. (In particular, this follows if small maps are closed under quotients.)
• If m : A C is monic and small, and f : C → D is small, then ∀f (A)  D is
small.
Finally, if C is exact, then the third condition (exponentiability of small maps) is
equivalent to
• 1  pevery small object is exponentiableq
but if C is not exact, then Theorem 7.11 does not apply, and so this latter property
does not imply the actual existence of exponentials.
Remark 10.3. Definition 10.2(i) is sometimes called the “axiom of replacement,”
but it actually has no connection to our axiom of replacement from §5. We prefer
to think of it as saying that the notions of “small family” in S and C agree.
Now the exponentiability of the representing map pi : E → S implies that it
determines an internal full subcategory ofC, i.e. an internal category whose object of
objects is S0 = S and whose object of morphisms is the exponential S1 = (p
∗
1E)
p∗
2
E
in S0×S0. (See [Joh02, B2.3.5] and [JM95, §I.5].) Regarding this as “the category
of sets,” we can then reason about it in the ordinary internal logic of C. That is, for
any U ∈ S, if ϕ is a formula in the language of categories with object-parameters
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given by maps U → S0 and arrow-parameters given by maps U → S1, then ϕ
has a meaning in the internal first-order logic of C and is classified by a subobject
JϕK U . Of course, in general JϕK may not be small.
Now suppose that ϕ is a formula over U in S in the sense of §7. Since each object-
parameter of ϕ is a small map X → U , there is a regular epi U ′  U over which
X is a pullback of pi, and similarly for arrow-parameters. Since ϕ has only finitely
many parameters, we can find a single cover U ′  U over which all parameters of
ϕ are represented by maps into S0 or S1, and thereby translate ϕ into a formula ϕ̂
at stage U ′ of the internal language of C about the internal category S1 ⇒ S0.
However, without further axioms, there is little we can say about the relationship
of ϕ to ϕ̂. Basically, the problem is that S only knows about the small objects over
1, but ϕ̂ knows about small maps over all objects of C. So we need to assume that
C is “generated by small objects” in a suitable sense.
Definition 10.4. A category of classes C is well-generated by small objects
if the following hold.
(i) The small objects are a strong generator: if A
f
−→ B is a monomorphism in
C and every map U → B factors through A when U is small, then f is an
isomorphism.
(ii) The small objects are relatively projective: if U is small and A
p
−− U is regular
epi, there is a small V and a regular epi V
q
−− U which factors through p.
(iii) The small objects are relatively indecomposable: if U is small and U = A∪B,
there are small objects V and W such that U = V ∪W , V ⊆ A, and W ⊆ B.
(iv) The small objects are collectively nonempty: if X is small and there is a map
X → 0, then X ∼= 0.
Remark 10.5. Two of these conditions are well-known: (i) is called the axiom of
small generators and (ii) is called the axiom of small covers (see [ABSS07b]). Note
that (i) is always true if interpreted in the stack semantics, since all identities are
small. By contrast, when (ii) is interpreted in the stack semantics of C, it becomes
precisely the usual “collection axiom” of algebraic set theory (see [JM95]).
Condition (iii) is rarely stated explicitly, since it follows from (ii) if all com-
plemented monics are small, which in turn follows from the common assumption
that all diagonals are small. And of course, (iv) is always true. However, we have
chosen to state all four axioms explicitly in order to complete the analogy with
(constructive) well-pointedness.
Remark 10.6. If S is small in some external set theory, then C has a restricted
Yoneda embedding C ↪→ Sh(S) into the category of sheaves for the coherent topol-
ogy on S. In this case, C is well-generated by small objects if and only if this functor
is coherent and conservative. This should be compared with Remark 3.7, and like-
wise the proof of Theorem 10.8 should be compared with that of Theorem 7.17.
Remark 10.6 suggests that Sh(S) itself should be a “canonical” choice of a cat-
egory of classes containing S, and in fact this is the case.
Proposition 10.7. For any small Heyting pretopos S, the category Sh(S) of
sheaves for the coherent topology on S is a category of classes in which S is a
well-generating category of small objects.
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Sketch of proof. The self-indexing of S is a stack for its coherent topology, so if
we rectify it to a strict functor Sop → Cat , it will become an internal category
in Sh(S) by the results of [Awo97, §V.1]. With S the object of objects of this
internal category and a suitable definition of E, this defines a representable notion
of smallness. We then show that a map Y → X is small iff for any U ∈ S and
any map y(U)→ X , where y : S ↪→ Sh(S) is the Yoneda embedding, the pullback
y(U)×X Y is representable. In particular, S is the category of small objects. It is
then straightforward to verify the axioms. 
With this example in mind, the following theorem realizes our claim in the
introduction that when S is small, the stack semantics of S can equivalently be
defined as a fragment of the internal logic of Sh(S), which is “canonical” modulo
the chosen strictification of the self-indexing. Recall the definition of a formula ϕ̂
in the internal logic of C from any formula ϕ in S in the language of a category.
Theorem 10.8. Let C be a category of classes which is well-generated by small
objects, and S the full subcategory of small objects. Then for any U ∈ S, any
formula ϕ over U in S, and any p : V → U in S, we have
V S ϕ ⇐⇒ V
′
C ϕ̂.
Here V ′ = V ×U U ′, where U ′  U is a cover chosen as in the definition of ϕ̂.
Note that on the left,  refers to the stack semantics notion of forcing, while on
the right it refers to the Kripke-Joyal semantics for the usual internal logic of C
(which is, of course, the same as the ∆0-fragment of the stack semantics of C, so
there is no real ambiguity in the notation).
Proof. The proof is by induction on ϕ. The cases of atomic formulas, >, ⊥, and ∧
are evident, so it remains to deal with ∨, ⇒, ∃, and ∀. We adopt the convention
that adding a prime symbol denotes passing to a regular-epi cover over which all
parameters are represented by morphisms to S0 or S1.
Disjunction: if V S (ϕ ∨ ψ), then we have V = W1 ∪W2 in S with W1 S ϕ
and W2 S ψ. By the inductive hypothesis, W
′
1 C ϕ̂ and W
′
2 C ψ̂; thus V
′ C
(ϕ̂ ∨ ψ̂) = ̂(ϕ ∨ ψ).
Conversely, if V ′ C (ϕ̂∨ψ̂), then V ′ = A′1∪A
′
2 with A
′
1 C ϕ̂ and A
′
2 C ψ̂. Let
Ai be the image of A
′
i in V , for i = 1, 2, so that V = A1 ∪ A2. Since small objects
are relatively indecomposable, we have V = W1 ∪ W2 in S with W1 ⊆ A1 and
W2 ⊆ A2. Therefore, W ′1 C ϕ̂ and W
′
2 C ψ̂, and so by the inductive hypothesis,
W1 S ϕ and W2 S ψ; hence V S (ϕ ∨ ψ).
Implication: suppose first V S (ϕ ⇒ ψ) and let A′ → V ′ be a map in C
such that A′ C ϕ̂. Form the classifying subobject Jψ̂K A
′ in C. Then for any
W → A′ where W ∈ S, we have W S (ϕ ⇒ ψ) and W ′ C ϕ̂, hence by the
inductive hypothesis W S ϕ; thus W S ψ and so (by the inductive hypothesis
again) W ′ C ψ̂. Therefore, W
′ factors through Jψ̂K, and so W factors through
Jψ̂K. Since the small objects are a strong generator, this implies Jψ̂K ∼= A′, and thus
A′ C ψ̂; hence V
′ C (ϕ̂⇒ ψ̂).
Conversely, suppose V ′ C (ϕ̂ ⇒ ψ̂) and let W → V be such that W S ϕ.
Then, by the inductive hypothesis, W ′ C ϕ̂, and so W
′ C ψ̂, hence W S ψ.
Thus, V S (ϕ⇒ ψ).
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Existential quantification: suppose first that V S (∃X)ϕ(X). Then we have
W ∈ S, a regular epi W  V , and an object Y ∈ S/W such that W S ϕ(Y ).
Passing to a coverW ′ W which represents Y (by a map y : W ′ → S0, say) as well
as all other parameters of ϕ, the inductive hypothesis implies that W ′ C ϕ̂(y).
Since W ′ → V ′ is regular epi, this implies V ′ C (∃y)ϕ̂(y).
Conversely, suppose V ′ C (∃θ)ϕ̂(θ). Then we have a cover A′  V ′ and a map
y : A′ → S0 with A′ C ϕ̂(y). Since small objects are relatively projective, there
is a regular epi W  V in S which factors through A′. Hence W C ϕ̂(y), so by
the inductive hypothesis, W S ϕ(Y ) where Y = y
∗E. Hence, V S (∃X)ϕ(X).
Existential quantification over arrows is analogous.
Universal quantification: suppose first that V ′ C (∀x)ϕ̂(x). Then for any
W → V in S and Y ∈ S/W , we can pass to a further cover W ′′ W ′ =W ×V V ′
over which Y is represented by some y : W ′ → S0. Since W
′′ C (∀y)ϕ̂(y), we
have W ′′ C ϕ̂(y), and hence by the inductive hypothesis W S ϕ(Y ). Thus,
V S (∀X)ϕ(X).
Conversely, suppose V S (∀X)ϕ(X), let A′ → V ′ be a map, take any y : A′ →
S0, and form the classifying subobject Jϕ̂(y)K A
′. Then for any map W
q
−→ A′
with W in S, we have W S (∀X)ϕ(X), and thus, by the inductive hypothesis,
W C ϕ̂(y). HenceW factors through Jϕ̂(y)K, so since the small objects are a strong
generator, we have Jϕ̂(y)K ∼= A′, and so A′ C ϕ̂(y). Therefore, V ′ C (∀x)ϕ̂(x).
Universal quantification over arrows is analogous. 
In particular, we have another way of producing autological (pre)topoi.
Definition 10.9. A category of classes satisfies the separation axiom if every
monomorphism is small.
Corollary 10.10. If C is a category of classes which is well-generated by small
objects and which satisfies the separation axiom, then its category S of small objects
is autological.
Proof. By Theorem 10.8, any sentence ϕ over U ∈ S induces a sentence ϕ̂ in the
internal logic of C at stage U ′ for some regular epi U ′  U . Since small objects
are relatively projective, we may as well assume that U ′ is small. By the separation
axiom, it follows that the usual classifying object Jϕ̂K in the internal logic of C is
small, and so by closure under images, the image of the composite Jϕ̂K→ U ′ → U is
a small subobject of U . The correspondence of Theorem 10.8 then directly implies
that this image classifies ϕ in the stack semantics of S, so S is autological. 
There remains the question of how a given category S can be embedded as the
category of small objects in some category of classes C. We have seen that there
is a “canonical” answer, namely Sh(S), but this category has some problems. In
particular, it fails to satisfy some desirable axioms of algebraic set theory, such as
that any quotient of a small object is small, or that all diagonals are small. We
didn’t need these axioms to prove Theorem 10.8, but we will need some of them
below to construct and compare models of material set theory. This problem can
be solved by restricting to the subcategory of sheaves whose diagonals are small;
these are the ideals of [AF06, AFW06].
Another problem, however, which afflicts both sheaves and ideals, is that not
all axioms satisfied by S extend to corresponding properties of these categories of
classes. Chief among the problematic axioms is separation; i.e. we have no converse
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to Corollary 10.10. The problem is that not all sheaves or ideals are “first-order
definable” from S, so the first-order axiom schema of autology for S cannot be
extended to the separation axiom for sheaves or ideals.
One solution to this problem is proposed in [ABSS07a, ABSS07b]: if S can be
equipped with an extra non-elementary structure called a superdirected structural
system of inclusions (sdssi), then it can be embedded in a category of superideals
which does satisfy separation. (The word “structural” in the term sdssi is backwards
from our usage—an sdssi is a very non-structural notion, in that it distinguishes
between isomorphic objects.) This includes both complete toposes and realizability
toposes, providing a unified reason why such toposes can model IZF.
We prefer to view autology as the property characterizing those toposes which
can model IZF, since unlike an sdssi, it is an elementary first-order property and can
be phrased in a purely structural (i.e. category-theoretic) way. (By Corollary 10.10,
any topos admitting an sdssi must be autological.) However, this would be most
satisfying if any autological topos could be embedded in a category of classes sat-
isfying the axiom of separation. One wants to consider the category of “first-order
definable classes” over S, but it is nearly impossible to give this meaning in a purely
structural way. However, we will show in [Shua] that there is a canonical answer
if we generalize to a 2-category of classes—namely, we can consider the 2-category
of stacks for the coherent coverage on on S which are “definable” from the stack
semantics in a precise sense. This modification is quite reasonable from the point
of view of structural set theory, since there a “proper class” is something quite
different from a set: at best it is a groupoid, having only a notion of isomorphism
between its objects, rather than a notion of equality.
We now turn to a comparison between models of material set theory in the
stack semantics and in a category of classes. Since Theorem 10.8 shows that the
underlying logics agree, it remains to compare the “material sets” in the two models.
This is quite similar to the situation in §9: the main difference is that in a category
of classes, the “material sets” are represented by morphisms into a single object V
(which is not, of course, small), rather than by morphisms into a family of objects
making up a “pre-universe.”
(In fact, there is a formal relationship: a pre-universe in a topos S, in Hayashi’s
sense, naturally forms a single object of the category of ideals, in which we can apply
the methods of this section. This is the jumping-off point of [ABSS07a, ABSS07b],
which not only constructs a category of ideals, but a corresponding forcing semantics
that generalizes Hayashi’s.)
As remarked above, in order to define the object V and perform this comparison,
we need a little more structure on our category of classes. By an X-indexed family
of small subobjects of A we mean a monic R  A × X such that the projection
R → X is a small map. A powerclass object of A is an object PsA equipped
with a universal PsA-indexed family of small subobjects of A. Note that in general,
PsA need not be small even if A is. It is shown in [JM95] that powerclass objects
can be constructed when C is exact. Authors who do not assume that C is exact
often assume directly that powerclass objects exist.
The following ad hoc definition summarizes what we need for our comparison.
Definition 10.11. A category of classes C has a good material model if it
satisfies the following.
STACK SEMANTICS 59
(i) C has a small nno.
(ii) If f and g are small, then so is Πfg.
(iii) C has powerclass objects.
(iv) If p is regular epi and fp is small, then f is small (equivalently, 1 C pif
Y → X is regular epi and Y is small, then X is smallq).
(v) The endofunctor Ps has an indexed initial algebra V , i.e. a Ps-algebra V such
that U∗V is an initial algebra for all U ∈ C.
Assumptions (i) and (ii) ensure that S is a Π-pretopos with a nno, so that the
theory of §6 can be applied in its stack semantics. The other three axioms are
about describing the universe-object V . Note that (iv) is necessary in order to
make Ps into a covariant functor in the usual way. (In fact, Ps can be made into a
monad, using (iv) again to obtain the multiplication—but we emphasize that the
relevant notion of “algebra” refers only to an algebra for Ps as an endofunctor,
not as a monad.) The indexed initial Ps-algebra V is constructed in [JM95] under
the assumption of exactness and a subobject classifier, and in [vdBM07] under the
assumption of W-types and “bounded exactness;” we will simply assume it to exist.
As for any initial algebra, the structure map PsV
v
−→ V is an isomorphism.
Thus, by the universal property of Ps, the inverse of v classifies a binary relation
≺ on V which is “set-based,” i.e. the second projection V≺ → V is small. It is
not hard to show that ≺ is well-founded and extensional. An interpretation of
material set theory in C is then obtained by considering V with ≺ as a model
for material sets with ∈ in the internal logic of C. It satisfies many of the axioms
automatically, while others are inherited from the corresponding categorical axioms
for C; see [JM95, MP02, vdBM07] for more details.
Remark 10.12. There is a slightly different thread in algebraic set theory, starting
with [Sim99] and continuing with [AF06, AFW06], in which material set theory is
not modeled in the initial Ps-algebra but in an arbitrary object U equipped with
a monomorphism PsU ↪→ U . The elements of U not in the image of PsU are
then regarded as “atoms,” and the axiom of foundation is not necessarily satisfied.
We will focus on the situation described above, which seems better suited to a
comparison with the stack semantics.
Now, from any morphism x : U → V we can construct a well-founded extensional
apg x over U as follows. First note that all our axioms are stable under pullback,
so we may as well assume that U = 1. Now let xˇ : N → PsV be the unique map
such that
1
o //
ηx
!!
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C N
s //
xˇ

N
xˇ

PsV c
// PsV
commutes. Here η : V → PsV is the unit of the monad Ps, while c is the composite:
PsV
Ps(v
−1)
−−−−−→ PsPsV
µ
−→ PsV
(where µ is the multiplication of the monad Ps). Now xˇ classifies an N -indexed
family of small subobjects of V , i.e. a map x→ N × V such that x→ N is small.
Since N is also small, x is a small object.
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Working in the internal logic of C, well-foundedness of V now implies that the
projection x → V is monic. Since it is also a simulation, it follows that x is well-
founded and extensional. It is rooted by x and accessible by definition, so it is a
well-founded extensional apg, as desired. And just as in §9, we can verify that
(i) U  (x ∼= y) if and only if x = y, and
(ii) U  (x  y) if and only if x ≺ y.
Thus it remains only to verify the analogue of Lemma 9.7.
Lemma 10.13. Let U ∈ S, and let X be a well-founded extensional apg in S/U
which remains well-founded in C/U . Then there exists a unique x : U → V such
that X ∼= x.
Proof. This is essentially the standard recursion theorem for well-founded relations.
Since V is an indexed initial algebra, it suffices to assume that U = 1. Define an
attempt to be a partial function X ⇀ V which is a simulation and whose domain
is a small initial segment of X . We can then use the internal logic of C to define
“the set of all attempts” as a subobject of Ps(X × V ). Since X is well-founded,
we can then prove by induction, as usual, that any two attempts agree on their
common domain, that the union of attempts is an attempt, and that the union of
all attempts has domain all of X . The resulting simulation X
f
−→ V then exhibits
X as isomorphic to x, where x is the composite 1
?
−→ X
f
−→ V , and it is unique
since V is extensional. 
However, without further axioms, there is no reason why every well-founded
extensional apg in S/U should also be well-founded in C/U . This will be true if
C satisfies the axiom of separation, but in general there might be new subobjects
of X in C/U that are not in S/U , so well-foundedness in C is a stronger statement
than well-foundedness in S. If we do have this stronger property, though, then we
can derive the desired equivalence.
Theorem 10.14. Let C be a category of classes which is well-generated by small
objects and has a good material model, with S its full subcategory of small objects,
and assume that for all U ∈ S, every well-founded extensional graph in S/U is
also well-founded in C. Then the interpretation of material set theory in the stack
semantics of S is identical to its interpretation relative to V in the internal logic
of C.
Proof. We have seen that under the given hypotheses, isomorphism classes of well-
founded extensional apgs in S/U can be identified with maps U → V , in a
way which preserves the atomic formulas. The same inductive argument from
Theorem 10.8 then implies that the interpretations agree on all formulas. 
Corollary 10.15. If C is a category of classes which is well-generated by small
objects and has a good material model, and moreover satisfies the separation axiom,
then the interpretation of material set theory in the stack semantics of its category
of small objects is identical to its interpretation relative to V in the internal logic
of C. 
Of course, asking that well-foundedness in S extends to C is a version of the
axiom of “full well-founded induction” relative to the containing category of classes
C. But even if S satisfies well-founded induction (in its stack semantics), this
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property will generally fail to be inherited by categories of sheaves or ideals. This
is the same problem we observed after Corollary 10.10,and it has the same solution.
Namely, we will show in [Shua] that the 2-category of definable stacks on S does
inherit full well-founded induction from S, and that the stack semantics of S can
be identified with the internal language of this 2-category. Thus, if we are willing
to generalize from categories of classes to “2-categories of classes,” stack semantics
and algebraic set theory can be seen as two faces of the same coin.
Appendix A. Material and structural foundations
As mentioned in the introduction, we prefer to view the correspondence between
set theories and (pre)toposes as a relationship between two different kinds of set
theory, which we call material and structural. In material set theories such as ZFC,
the elements of a set X have an independent reality and identity, apart from their
being collected together as the elements of X ; frequently they are also sets them-
selves. The name “material” is a suggestion of Steve Awodey [Awo96]; they are also
called “membership-based” set theories. By contrast, in structural set theories such
as ETCS, the elements of a set X have no existence or identity independent of X ,
and in particular are not sets themselves; they are merely abstract “elements” with
which we build mathematical structures. We call these theories “structural” be-
cause they are closely aligned with the mathematical philosophy of “structuralism”
(see e.g. [McL93, Awo04]); they are also called “categorical” set theories.
Remark A.1. In structural set theory, it is generally not meaningful to ask whether
two elements of two different sets are equal, only whether two elements of a given
ambient set are equal. In this way, structural set theory is very similar to type
theory, and a case can be made that they are really different names for the same
thing. There are undeniable differences in presentation and emphasis, but there is
certainly a large space of theories which it is difficult to classify as one and not the
other. In particular, as we remarked in footnote 2 on page 4, the stack semantics
could equally well be phrased using a type theory with quantification over types.
Material set theory, of course, has a long history as a foundation for mathe-
matics, while structural set theory has not gained as broad a following, although
Lawvere first wrote down the axioms of ETCS nearly 50 years ago. According to
its proponents, structural set theory provides a foundation for mathematics which
is just as adequate as the foundation provided by material set theory, and which is
moreover closer to mathematical practice and free of superfluous data.
In support of this thesis, we observe that in most of mathematics, sets serve
merely as carriers of structure: group structure, ring structure, topological struc-
ture, etc. This view of mathematics was formally enshrined in Bourbaki’s “general
theory of structure” [Bou68]. Moreover, these structures, and hence the sets from
which they are built, are generally only ever considered up to isomorphism. It never
matters to the working mathematician whether the natural numbers are defined in
von Neumann’s way:
0 = ∅, 1 = {0}, 2 = {0, 1}, 3 = {0, 1, 2}, . . .
or in some other way, such as:
0 = ∅, 1 = {0}, 2 = {1}, 3 = {2}, . . .
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since the two resulting versions of N are canonically isomorphic. In particular, the
intricate global membership structure of material set theory is irrelevant outside
of set theory proper. Indeed, Bourbaki had to carefully specify exactly how this
superfluous data is to be forgotten, in order that all of their structures would be
invariant under isomorphism. In structural set theory this process of careful for-
getting is unnecessary, since there is no global ∈ in the first place. (The complexity
of the Cole-Mitchell-Osius construction summarized in §6 testifies to the amount
of data that must be forgotten.)
From this point of view, the value of an equivalence between material and struc-
tural set theory is that it implies that in principle, either could serve equally well
as a foundation for mathematics. Of course, what really matters is the naturalness
of the encoding—structural set theory would not be a very attractive foundation
if mathematics could only be encoded in it by way of material set theory! How-
ever, the observations above about mathematical structure provide good empirical
evidence that in fact, the situation is reversed: material set theory provides a foun-
dation for most mathematics only by way of structural set theory.
On the other hand, the material point of view is not without advantages, espe-
cially in set theory proper. Although the entire study of ZF could be reinterpreted
structurally in terms of well-founded extensional relations, the result would be un-
necessarily complicated. In particular, some of the powerful methods of material set
theory seem difficult to duplicate structurally without significant circumlocution.
This seems to be essentially the point expressed by Mathias [Mat01]:
If one wants to do geometry, why bother with von Neumann or-
dinals? What do they do that is not achieved by arbitrary well-
orderings? Perhaps nothing. . .
But if, sated with geometry, one wants to do transfinite recursion
theory, why make life hard by avoiding von Neumann ordinals?
Thus, we believe that there should be no real conflict between the two kinds of set
theory. Rather, as frequently happens in mathematics, we simply have two different
viewpoints on the same underlying reality. And as always in such a situation,
recognition of this means that we can switch between the two theories freely, using
whichever is most convenient for any purpose. From this perspective, our goal in
this paper has been to extend the language and tools of structural set theory so
as to deal with unbounded quantifiers directly, facilitating more direct comparisons
with the corresponding language and tools of material set theory. The extension
we have arrived at (the stack semantics) also of course has potential applications
in topos theory by itself, which we hope to explore in later work.
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